The Laws of War and the  Lesser Evil by Blum, Gabriella
Article
The Laws of War and the "Lesser Evil"
Gabriella Blumt
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 2
I1. IHL, ICL, AND NECESSITY ............................................................................................................ 7
A. The General Framework of IHL and ICL ....................................................................... 7
B. Necessity in IHL and ICL ............................................................................................. 12
III. THREE CASE STUDIES ...................................................................................................................... 15
A. The "'Early Warning Procedure .. ................................................................................ 15
B . T o rture ............................................................................................................................... 19
C. Hiroshima and Nagasaki ............................................................................................. 24
IV. COMPARING DOMESTIC NECESSITY AND HUMANITARIAN NECESSITY ....................................... 31
A. The Necessity Defense in Criminal Law ....................................................................... 32
B. The Analogy to IHL ............................................................................................................ 34
V. CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EXCLUSION OF A CHOICE-OF-EVILS JUSTIFICATION
IN IH L ............................................................................................................................................. 3 8
A. Deontological Justifications ........................................................................................ 39
B. Consequentialist Justifications .................................................................................... 44
1. Uncertainty ...................................................................................................... 45
2. The Slippery Slope Argument ............................................................................ 47
3. Spillover Effects ............................................................................................... 49
C. Institutional Considerations ......................................................................................... 50
VI. DESIGNING A HUMANITARIAN NECESSITY JUSTIFICATION .......................................................... 53
A. A Lesser Evil ...................................................................................................................... 55
1. Who Counts? .................................................................................................... 55
1. Enemy Civilians .................................................................................... 56
2. Enemy Soldiers ....................................................................................... 57
3. One's Own Civilians ............................................................................. 58
4. One's Own Soldiers ............................................................................. 59
5. Others ................................................................................................... 60
2. How Many Count? ........................................................................................... 60
B. Timing ofAssessment .................................................................................................... 62
C . In ten tio ns ............................................................................................................................ 6 3
D. Imminence and Fault .................................................................................................... 63
E. Causal Connection ............................................................................................................. 64
F. Less Harmful Alternatives .............................................................................................. 66
G. Burden of Proof ................................................................................................................. 67
H. Summary ............................................................................................................................ 67
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 67
t Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Lucian Bebchuk, Glenn
Cohen, Jack Goldsmith, Richard Goldstone, Ryan Goodman, Duncan Kennedy, Adriaan Lanni, Daryl
Levinson, Larry May, Dan Meltzer, Martha Minow, Gerald Neuman, Benjamin Roin, Benjamin Sachs,
Jed Shugerman, Matthew Stephenson, Bill Stuntz, Adrian Vermeule, and the participants of the Harvard
Law School faculty workshop and the International Law Colloquium at the Hebrew University for
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. I am indebted to Natalie Lockwood, Alyssa Saunders and
Noga Firstenberg for excellent research assistance. I also thank Marina Eisner and Jesse Payne-Johnson
of the Yale Journal of International Law Board for their editorial work. Any errors are mine.
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
At Agincourt in 1415, Henry V ordered a coup de grdce for severely
wounded French soldiers. Today, this would be a war crime: the laws of war
mandate caring for the wounded and prohibit mercy killing.' Defenders of the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 claim that for all
their disastrous effects, these bombings were necessary to conclude the war
and put an end to great suffering on both sides. Whatever one makes of these
claims on their factual merits, the laws of war categorically forbid the
intentional killing of civilians; Hiroshima and Nagasaki were indisputably war
2crimes. In 1990, some believed that Saddam Hussein should be assassinated
so that the Iraqi and Kuwaiti people could be liberated from his oppressive
rule without the need for a military invasion that would visit devastation on
numerous people. 3 Under the laws of war, the lawfulness of targeting a
foreign leader outside of an ongoing armed conflict is dubious. Humanitarian
interventions like the one undertaken by the United States and its allies in
1999 to stop the genocide in Kosovo are, by definition, designed to save lives.
Humanitarian objectives make no difference under the laws of war, which
generally forbid armed aggression across borders no matter what the reason.
Thus, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, established to
review Operation "Allied Force" in 1999, deemed the humanitarian
intervention to stop the genocide in Kosovo "illegal"-albeit also
"legitimate." 4 Switching the political valence, some have argued that torture
should be permissible in the war on terrorism under extreme circumstances,
such as the "ticking bomb" scenario in which harm to many innocent victims
could be prevented. Yet the legal prohibition on torture is absolute and leaves
no room for exceptions.
Widely differing moral and political intuitions apply to each of these
cases, making them the subject of heated debates among lawyers,
policymakers, and the public at large. But international law as it stands echoes
nothing of this disagreement. Instead, it takes an absolutist stance, rejecting
any justification that might exculpate states or individuals from liability for
violating its rules. The claim that certain war crimes might actually lead to the
saving of innocent lives-even many thousands of innocent lives-is
I. See Additional Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts arts. 10(1), 41, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 1]. In 2005, a
U.S. military court found a U.S. Army Captain guilty of charges related to the shooting to death of a
wounded paramilitary combatant Iraqi. The Captain's claim that the death was a mercy killing was
overruled by the court in deference to the Rules of Engagement which prohibit the shooting of an
injured and unarmed man. See Melissa Eddy, U.S. Soldier Convicted in Iraqi Shooting Death, WASH.
POST, Apr. 1, 2005, at A2 1; Melissa Eddy, U.S. Soldier Tells Court He Shot Iraqi Out of Mercy, WASH.
POST, Mar. 31, 2005, at A10.
2. See infra Section III.C.
3. Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would It Be a Crime?, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1990, at
D1. In 2003, the suggestion was raised once again. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Mercy Killings, FOREIGN
POL'Y, May-June 2003, at 72.
4. See INDEPENDENT INT'L COMM'N ON KoSovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLIcT,
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 185-98 (2000) (labeling the Kosovo intervention as
illegal, but legitimate); see also id. at 186. This report was prepared by the Expert Commission, also
known as the "Goldstone Commission," not to be confused with the recent Goldstone Report on the
Gaza Conflict.
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categorically rejected by the laws of war. Put bluntly, in many cases, the laws
of war demand an excessive sacrifice of lives.
Why this should be so is hardly self-evident. Evolving through centuries
of wars and destruction, the laws of war-or, as they are otherwise known,
"international humanitarian law" (IHL)-were designed to protect combatants
and civilians from the scourge of war, even while accepting the inevitability
of war as a human evil. IHL's rules reflect a compromise between effective
prosecution of war and the ideal of protecting the lives and human rights of
those endangered by it. To safeguard these compromises, the field of IHL was
designed as a closed legal system, immune from the general justifications for
breach of obligations that apply in other spheres of international law. In
particular, no state or individual may violate the laws of war in the name of
military necessity-i.e., in the name of promoting the effectiveness of the
military operation-since that necessity has already been incorporated into the
balance struck by the legal rules.
But if IHL is designed to minimize humanitarian suffering within the
constraints of war, then it is not at all clear why measures intended to further
minimize suffering-as opposed to measures intended to promote the
effectiveness of the war at the cost of more suffering-cannot serve as a
justification for violation of IHL rules. The puzzle, in other words, is not why
IHL rejects military necessity but why it rejects humanitarian necessity-a
choice of a lesser evil-as a justification for breaking the laws of war.6 If the
use of nonlethal chemical weapons (such as tear gas), the torture of an
individual in a "ticking bomb" scenario, clandestine operations carried out by
commando soldiers disguised as civilians, or even the intentional targeting of
some civilians could save more innocent lives than they cost, why would IHL
not embrace these tactics as furthering its humanitarian mission, rather than,
as it does, making all of them war crimes?
The developments of the past decade or so in the field of international
criminal law (ICL) have made this question particularly pressing. ICL
translates states' obligations under IHL into individual duties, making grave
breaches of IHL indictable and punishable as war crimes. The establishment
and operation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) marks the worldwide
effort to internationalize the enforcement of ICL so as to fight impunity and
ensure individual criminal accountability for war crimes. This development
has a direct bearing on the normative implications of the rejection of a
humanitarian necessity justification: for any particular actor, the denial of a
lesser-evil justification as a matter of international law can make the
difference between innocence and guilt in the ICC or in any other court of law
5. Military necessity is both an enabling and a constraining principle. It allows parties in
conflict to inflict direct and intentional damage onto the military personnel and targets of the
counterparty. But it also restricts permissible damage to that which is legal under the laws of war, and
more importantly, to that which is actually necessary to attain the military goal. See ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 280-84 (2d ed. 2008); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY NORMS 215-17 (1989); Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber
and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
213, 215-19 (1998).
6. 1 limit my discussion to international humanitarian law of international armed conflict,
leaving aside the laws of nonintemational armed conflicts.
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that adjudicates war-related activities. Should a defendant who violated IHL
in order to save, or with the effect of saving, lives be convicted of war crimes?
Ironically, the Rome Statute of the ICC recognizes a variation of the self-
serving military necessity claim as justifyin exemption from liability, but not
any form of a humanitarian necessity claim.
These questions have gone surprisingly unaddressed in existing legal
scholarship, which has been highly deferential to and accepting of the current,
absolutist system of IHL. Existing legal scholarship has paid much attention to
the possible justification for breaching jus ad bellum-the laws pertaining to
the initial use of force against another state (in the contexts of humanitarian
interventions in Kosovo, Liberia, Somalia;8 and in a different setting, debating
the 2003 invasion of Iraq). It has also paid much attention to the possible
justifications for breaching some individual rules of jus in bello-the laws
regulating the use of force within an armed conflict (such as torture,
9
assassination of rogue leaders,' 0 or the use of prohibited weapons'l) . But the
broader question of whether the existing structures of IHL-its premises,
fundamental principles, distinctions, and application-actually promote
humanitarian goals or hinder them has remained largely within the domain of
philosophical literature, eluding the lawyers.
12
This Article addresses the issue of humanitarian necessity head-on. It
explores possible reasons why IHL and its supporters have refused to
countenance the possibility of humanitarian necessity as a justification for
violating its rules. Three possible explanations of IHL's absolutist stance are
developed. The first is based on deontological moral reasoning. The second
follows from traditional rule-consequentialist arguments, including concerns
about uncertainty, slippery slopes, and spillover effects. The third, also
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 31(l)(d), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
8. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE To FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND
ARMED ATTACKS 174-91 (2002), which argues that there is no need to formally change the law, but
instead suggests accommodating cases of humanitarian intervention through interpretive "mitigation";
lan Johnstone, The Plea of "Necessity" in International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian Intervention
and Counter-Terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337 (2005); and Eric A. Posner, International
Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2006), which discusses the case for a welfarist-
based reform of international law.
9. I refer to this literature infra Section III.B.
10. See Turner, supra note 3.
11. See, e.g., JEFFREY W. LEGRO, COOPERATION UNDER FIRE: ANGLO-GERMAN RESTRAINT
DURING WORLD WAR II 153 (1995); RICHARD M. PRICE, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TABOO (1997);
WARD THOMAS, THE ETHICS OF DESTRUCTION: NORMS AND FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(2001); Richard Price & Nina Tannenwald, Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical
Weapons Taboos, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS
114 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996). Note, however, that the discussion of prohibited weapons, for the
most part, focused on the underlying rationale of various prohibitions more than on the possible
necessity to breach them in any particular situation.
12. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (2d ed. 1992); G.E.M. Anscombe, War and Murder, in NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: A CATHOLIC RESPONSE 45-62 (1961); R.B. Brandt, Utilitarianism and the Rules of War, I
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 145 (1972); R.M. Hare, Rules of War and Moral Reasoning, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 166
(1972); Anthony E. Hartle, Humanitarianism and the Laws of War, 61 PHIL. 109 (1986); George 1.
Mavrodes, Conventions and the Morality of War, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 117 (1975); Thomas Nagel, War
and Massacre, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123 (1972); Paul Woodruff, Justification or Excuse: Saving Soldiers
at the Expense of Civilians, 8 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 159 (Supp. 1982).
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broadly rule-consequentialist in orientation, focuses on institutional
considerations, including the process of lawmaking, adjudication, and
enforcement of IHL rules. The Article argues that none of these accounts can
convincingly explain IHL's wholesale exclusion of humanitarian necessity as
a justification for violating its first-order rules.
Consequently, the Article argues that international law would do well to
move away from its absolutist stance and incorporate a humanitarian necessity
justification. The constructive ambition of the Article is to help design an
effective and workable legal standard for implementing such a justification. In
doing so, the Article begins with the obvious analogy of the necessity defense
in domestic criminal law, which takes seriously the possibility of justifying
violence in contexts where it is the lesser evil. 13 While the differences
between regulating ordinary violence among citizens and regulating the state's
use of force against enemies prevent the direct transposition of legal rules and
strategies from one context to the other, the comparison is nonetheless an
illuminating starting point. Building on that comparison, and on the critical
exploration of IHL's preference for absolute rules, the Article develops a
blueprint for defining a humanitarian justification for prima facie violations of
the laws of war.
In doing so, and to demonstrate what might be at stake in recognizing or
excluding a humanitarian necessity justification, I rely on three case studies.
Each involves a claim that a state's armed forces violated the laws of war in
order to avoid greater humanitarian suffering. In the "Early Warning
Procedure," the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) employed local residents to aid in
the arrest of suspected Palestinian militants in the West Bank, claiming this
practice minimized the risk of collateral damage to nearby civilians if the need
to perform a violent arrest arose. The second case is the paradigmatic example
of torturing an individual to retrieve information that would avert an imminent
attack. The third case is the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at
the end of World War II, which then-Secretary of War Henry Stimson
described as "deliberate, premeditated destruction [which] was our least
abhorrent choice." 14 1 use the atomic bombings as an extreme metonymy for
all deliberate infliction of civilian casualties in the effort to spare a greater
number of casualties.
These cases make vivid the challenge of tempering the laws of war with
a humanitarian justification. The entire project of IHL is premised on the idea
that some cruelty must be curbed, even at the expense of prolonging lawful
violence and suffering. That project would collapse if a state could claim to
reduce suffering by carpet-bombing the enemy's capital just to finish the war
more quickly-and only in part because a long history of much cruelty refutes
the correlation between superfluous ruthlessness and speedy victory. The goal
here is to find a place for a humanitarian necessity justification that would
13. Other fields of law, such as torts, antitrust, and regulation, pose similar questions with
regard to structures of rules and exceptions, utilitarianism and moral absolutes. I choose to focus the
comparison on criminal law as the most immediately analogous field in terms of its subject matter and
content.
14. Robert C. Batchfelder, Dropping the Atomic Bomb: Right or Wrong?, in HIROSHIMA: THE
DECISION To USE THE A-BOMB 106, 109 (Edwin Fogelman ed., 1964).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
allow parties in conflict to engage in welfare-increasing actions without
collapsing the entire project of IHL. Whatever its concrete pay-off, this effort
reveals and casts in a new light some of the deepest premises of the laws of
war and invites further inquiry into their humanitarian achievements.
The last Part of the Article is devoted to the prescriptive design of a
humanitarian necessity justification in IHL. Building on the analysis and case
studies offered earlier, I suggest a blueprint for the definition of the
humanitarian justification, which would enable us to distinguish the "right"
case from all the wrong ones. Under this definition, an actor would be exempt
from criminal liability if the conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime
was designed to minimize harm to individuals other than the defendant's
compatriots, the person could reasonably expect that his action would be
effective as the direct cause of minimizing the harm, and there were no less
harmful alternatives under the circumstances to produce a similar
humanitarian outcome.
Some methodological clarifications are in order: the Article assumes a
general obligation to obey IHL rules. It does not ask when it would be right to
ignore the law, but instead why the law is such that it does not allow for its
violation under circumstances that may seem just. The pros and cons of
amending international law as opposed to accepting certain acts that are
"outside" the law as legitimate have already been discussed in the contexts of
humanitarian interventions and torture. 15 Avoiding repetition of these
arguments, the Article works within the legal framework of IHL. The Article
does not aspire to test the appropriateness or sensibility of particular IHL rules
or offer any amendment to them. For this reason, the humanitarian necessity
paradigm is limited to a justification, rather than an amendment of primary
obligations.16 In this respect as well, I accept the basic framework of IHL,
along with its core principles, such as distinction and proportionality. 17
Finally, and in a similar spirit, I follow the well-recognized distinction
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and limit my discussion to justified
circumstances for breach of the latter, independently of the question of
whether the war was just or worthwhile to begin with.
15. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Supreme Court Review, Foreword: Terrorism and Utilitarianism:
Lessons from, and for, Criminal Law, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2002); Oren Gross, Are Torture
Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481 (2004);
Alon Harel & Assaf Sharon, What Is Really Wrong with Torture?, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 241 (2008).
16. There is an extensive debate in the literature on whether necessity should be considered a
justification or excuse, both in criminal law and in international law. For the purposes of this Article, I
leave aside this debate, choosing the justification paradigm so as to emphasize that in the relevant cases,
it is the act itself that is not wrong, rather than the attribution of responsibility to the actor. On the
distinction between justification and excuse, see J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 1 (1957). See also George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing
Conditions, in CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 137 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 1994); Anthea Roberts, Legality
Verses [sic] Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force Be Illegal but Justified?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION,
AND THE USE OF FORCE 179 (Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald eds., 2008) (stating that many Western
lawyers believe that NATO's actions in Kosovo should be excused despite their apparent illegality).
17. For a general critique of existing dogmatism in human rights or IHL, one which overlooks
or excludes other strategies for bringing about emancipation, peace and justice, see DAVID KENNEDY,
THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM (2004). Kennedy's
suggestions for alternative strategies include social welfare and redistributive economics, as ways of
reallocating status and power. Id. at 11.
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Finally, the Article proceeds in full recognition that most violations of
IHL are not motivated by the wish to cause less humanitarian harm. Indeed, if
human nature were prone to this kind of calculation, and more so in wartime,
much of IHL would be redundant. The Article also recognizes the possible
dangers of malevolent exploitation that any exemption from liability for war
crimes might harbor. Nonetheless, the fact remains that some violations of the
laws of war could actually cause less suffering overall. If the absolutist stance
of IHL inhibits states from committing such violations, then this absolutist
stance and its rejection of any humanitarian exemption does a disservice to the
goals of IHL.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II offers a rough primer on the
features of IHL and on the current state of affairs with regard to necessity in
IHL and in ICL. Part III describes three real cases in which actors sought to
invoke some kind of a humanitarian necessity justification for breaking IHL
rules. Part IV lays out the various components of the necessity defense in
domestic criminal law and explains why their transposition to the international
level would require adaptation. Part V develops and tests the most plausible
explanations for rejecting a lesser-evil paradigm, including deontological,
consequentialist, and institutional arguments. Part VI develops a workable
definition for a humanitarian necessity justification. The Article concludes by
pointing to a set of further questions that this study raises about IHL and
international law more generally, namely the tension between consequentialist
and deontological drives, the possibilities and constraints of transposing
domestic legal notions onto the international plane, and our assumptions with
regard to individuals' and states' decisionmaking processes.
II. IHL, ICL, AND NECESSITY
A. The General Framework of lHL and ICL
The stated goal of IHL is minimizing humanitarian suffering of both
combatants and civilians during the conduct of hostilities. 18 It accepts as a
regrettable reality the failure to eradicate the use of force in international
relations altogether, and seeks, as second best, to place effective limits on the
scope of destruction and suffering that such force may lawfully inflict. One
articulation of its purposes may be found in the 1868 St. Petersburg
Declaration, which states:
[T]he progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the
calamities of war: That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to
18. The International Committee of the Red Cross explains that "[i]nternational humanitarian
law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It
protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and
methods of warfare." ADVISORY SERV. ON INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? (2004), http://www.icrc.org[Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/
htmlall/humanitarian-law-factsheet/$File/What isIHL.pdf; see also William J. Fenrick, International
Humanitarian Law and Combat Casualties, 21 EUR. J. POPULATION 167, 168 (2005) (noting that the
fundamental purpose of IHL is "to reduce net human suffering and net damage to civilian objects in
armed conflict").
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accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; ... [and that the
parties agree on the need] to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity.19
"International Humanitarian Law" is a term of the past century alone
even though the notion of regulating and limiting warfare is almost as ancient
as wars themselves. The Bible, the codes of ancient Greece, the Indian law of
Manu-all contained some prohibitions on warfare, the violation of which
was an offense to divine order.2° Subsequent centuries have witnessed the
evolution of additional rules of war, deriving from notions of honor and
chivalry (which applied only among knights), Catholic notions of Just War
(which applied only to Catholics), or reciprocal exchanges of commitments
21(which applied only to those who have assumed similar commitments).
The more recent emphasis on humanitarian law signifies a shift from the
traditional motivations of reciprocity in rules of engagement, notions of honor
or chivalry, and religious teachings and natural law, toward laws that are more
absolute, unconditioned by reciprocity, and unlimited to any one class,
religion, or race. This change marked the move from the sovereign or state as
the bearer of rights to a more enlightened human society which identifies the
welfare of individuals as its subject of concern. This is how the humanitarian
value came to replace war in explaining what thejus was about.
As a sociological observation, while the terms "laws of war" and
"international humanitarian law" are widely considered interchangeable in
translating the original Latin term of jus in bello, the choice of which
translation to use is not devoid of political or symbolic inclination. 23 The
International Committee of the Red Cross publishes guidebooks on
International Humanitarian Law just as the Army Field Manual refers to the
Laws of Armed Conflict. The content of both is not very different.24
With the shift toward absolute and unconditional obligations, many of
the earlier prescriptions have survived, sometimes under a new rationale, and
other obligations, partly building on human rights law, have been added. In
balancing between the necessities of war and humanitarian considerations, the
historical evolution of the laws of war has been to ratchet humanitarian
obligations up, never down. As new treaties were negotiated against the
19. Declaration of St. Petersburg, Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in CONVENTIONS AND
DECLARATIONS BETWEEN THE POWERS CONCERNING WAR, ARBITRATION AND NEUTRALITY 6 (1915)
(renouncing the use, in time of war, of explosive projectiles weighing less than four hundred grams).
The Declaration is widely accepted as customary international law.
20. On the perspectives of various traditions on just wars, see generally THE ETHICS OF WAR:
SHARED PROBLEMS IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS (Richard Sorabji & David Rodin eds., 2006).
21. For a general history of the laws of war, see THE LAW OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON
WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos & Mark R. Shulman
eds., 1994); and STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY (2005).
22. See DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 83-84 (2006).
23. Id. at 83.
24. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE at Appendix A-I (1956) ("The law of war . . . requires that belligerents refrain from
employing any kind or degree of violence which is not actually necessary for military purposes and that
they conduct hostilities with regard for the principles of humanity and chivalry."), with INT'L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS, BASIC RULES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS I
(1988), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlalVpO365/$File/ICRC_002_0365.PDF ("It is
prohibited to employ weapons or methods of warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary losses or
excessive suffering.").
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collapse of the humanitarian order in previous conflicts, their terms enhanced
the protections for individuals and objects and expanded the prohibitions on
means and methods of permissible warfare.
Like most other fields of international law, IHL operates in what is still
largely an anarchical international society, lacking any central legislative,
mandatory adjudication, or enforcement mechanisms. Its rules are the result of
either interstate political negotiations (conventional IHL) or else the
longstanding practice of some states, which other states grew to recognize as
binding customary international law.
Many IHL norms are articulated in terms of relative standards; it is
unlawful to conduct attacks that are "expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life. .. which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated." 25 The use of weapons which cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited. The destruction of
private property is allowed only "where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations, 26 and prisoners of war (POWs)
are to be evacuated to safe zones "as soon as possible." 27 Many others norms,
however, are articulated as concrete and absolute rules: the use of chemical or
biological weapons is absolutely prohibited.2 8 The torture of prisoners of wars
or civilians is never lawful. 29 The carrying out of attacks while posing as a
civilian is illegal perfidy. 30 The intentional (as distinguished from foreseen-
yet-unintended) killing of a civilian is always a war crime. 31 Both the
32standards and rules of IHL do not tolerate deviations or derogations.
The delicate compromises struck and articulated as IHL rules were to be
protected under a closed system, immune to any and all justifications for
breaking the law. 33 Specifically, the need to prosecute the war effectively
25. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(5)(b).
26. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
27. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 19, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
28. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21, 1974
U.N.T.S. 45; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
29. Geneva Convention III, supra note 27, art. 17; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, art.
32.
30. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 1, art. 37.
31. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, art. 32.
32. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 24, at 3-4.
33. The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility recognize
general defenses that allow states to escape some international obligations under unusual conditions,
including force majeure, duress, and necessity. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, art. 25, in Report of the International
Law Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 31, 80, U.N.
Doc. A/56/20 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles]. Article 26 of the Draft Articles, however, precludes
these general defenses from applying where peremptory norms are concerned, and Article 55 notes that
the Draft Articles are inapplicable "where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an
internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a
State are governed by special rules of international law." Id. art. 55. Most commentators agree that IHL
is a sphere governed by special rules for the purposes of Article 55. See Marco Sassoli, State
Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 401, 402
(2002).
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could not be raised as a justification for any violation, since it has already
been incorporated into the principle of military necessity. 34 At once an
enabling and a constraining principle, military necessity allows "those
measures that are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which
are lawful according to the modem law and usages of war."35 Parties are thus
allowed to inflict intentional damage on the military personnel and targets of
their enemies; but they are allowed to do so only insofar as the damage is
actually necessary for attaining military goals. As the Lieber Code explains,
"military necessary does not admit of cruelty-that is, the infliction of
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge. 36
Unlike the body of ICL, which developed later in time, laws of war
obligations were not assumed with the purpose of entailing direct
responsibilities for individuals, but only for states, as representing their polity.
Although as a matter of legal rinciple, a state that breaches the laws of war is
required to make reparations, the strict legal responsibility of states has been
generally unenforceable on the international plane. 38 Absent external
mandatory mechanisms, violations of the laws of war at the state level were
left to international diplomacy, or its Clausewitzian extension 39-namely,
coercive power. As a result, the enforcement of IHL has traditionally been the
province of victors' justice, such as in the Peace Treaty of Versailles or the
40Potsdam Agreement.
As for individuals committing breaches of the laws of war, especially
those offenses that are considered "grave breaches,' enforcement was
34. In comment 19 to Article 25 of the Draft Articles, the ILC stated that "certain
humanitarian conventions applicable to armed conflict expressly exclude reliance on military necessity.
Others while not explicitly excluding necessity are intended to apply in abnormal situations of peril for
the responsible State and plainly engage its essential interests. In such a case the non-availability of the
plea of necessity emerges clearly from the object and the purpose of the rule." Draft Articles, supra note
33, art. 25, cmt. 19.
35. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
IN THE FIELD art. 14, at 7 (Gov't Printing Office 1898) (1863) (officially published as U.S. War Dep't,
General Orders No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863)).
36. Id. art. 16, at 8.
37. 1 COMMENTARY ON THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 373 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952); 2 id.
at 270 (1960); 3 id. at 629 (1960); 4 id. at 602 (1958).
38. Although in several notable cases, in most of which one of the parties contested the
jurisdiction of the Court, the ICJ did address violations of IHL in armed conflicts. See, e.g., Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 19); Oil
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). Regional courts, too, attempted to adjudicate the
military conduct of states-particularly the European Court of Human Rights, which has in recent years
addressed human rights violations in the conflict between Russia and Chechnya. Nonetheless, the source
of the court's jurisdiction as well as reasoning was the European Convention on Human Rights rather
than any traditional IHL instrument. See Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 847, paras. 208, 226, 230,
236 (2005).
39. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (M. Howard & P. Paret eds. & trans., 1976) ("[W]ar
is not a mere an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other
means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means .... The political object
is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their
purpose.").
40. See Paul Betts, Germany, International Justice and the Twentieth Century, HIST. &
MEMORY, Spring/Summer 2005, at 45, 63-65.
41. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, arts, 11, 85; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
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largely considered a domestic matter, to be dealt with individually by each
state vis-d-vis its own agents. Naturally, this system of domestic enforcement
worked, if at all, only in those cases where violations were committed without
the state's instruction or acquiescence. Outside their own states, individuals
have faced trial almost exclusively in ad hoc tribunals-in Nuremberg and
Tokyo for crimes related to World War II, in The Hague for crimes related to
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia 42 (ICTY)), and in Arusha for crimes related to the
conflict in Rwanda (the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 43
(ICTR)). In select instances, states have tried their own soldiers for crimes
committed in the context of hostilities.44 Others, like Belgium, famously (and
mostly unsuccessfully) attempted to invoke universal jurisdiction over war
criminals at large.
45
In 1998, the internationally negotiated Rome Statute46 sought to fight
impunity by effectively breaking the division of labor between the
international level, where rules were negotiated and articulated, and the
domestic level, where rules were to be adjudicated and enforced. The ICC
subsequently established in 2002 now has the power to judge individuals for
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 47 in cases where states
either fail or refuse to prosecute the offender.48 Although the ICC has not yet
successfully completed a prosecution of any offender,4 in aspiration, it is the
world's first international (ideally, universal) mechanism to adjudicate and
enforce individuals' responsibility for grave breaches of IHL everywhere.
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Ill, supra note 27, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 26, art. 147.
42. The ICTY has operated since 1993 to try individuals charged with the commission of war
crimes during the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s. More than sixty defendants have been convicted
to date. For more information, see About the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/3 (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
See also S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the ICTY).
43. The ICTR was established by U.N. Security Council resolution in 1994, and is charged
with prosecuting individuals for genocide and other serious violations of IHL. For further information,
see Welcome to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, http://www.ictr.org (last visited Nov. 6,
2009). See also S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the ICTR).
44. The most commonly referenced are the "hybrid courts" in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra
Leone, and Cambodia-all established in the context of intrastate armed conflicts. See Office of the
U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the
Legacy of Hybrid Courts, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/08/2 (2008).
45. Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-
2008, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 927, 933-35 (2009).
46. Rome Statute, supra note 7. As of July 2009, 110 states are members of the Court. Int'l
Criminal Court, The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+
parties (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
47. Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 6-8. Article 5 enumerates the crime of aggression, but
this crime has not yet been defined. The Statute mandates that it be defined "consistent with the relevant
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." Id. art. 5(2).
48. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 17(l)(a).
49. The court has opened investigations into four situations: Northern Uganda, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and Darfur. For more information, see
International Criminal Court: All Situations, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/
Situations (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). It has issued public arrest warrants for twelve people; six of them
remain free, two have died, and four are in custody. The first trial, that of Congolese militia leader
Thomas Lubanga, began on January 26, 2009. See International Criminal Court: Democratic Republic of
the Congo, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0104/
Related+Cases/ICC+0 104+0106/Democratic+Republic+of+the+Congo.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
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B. Necessity in IHL and ICL
As mentioned earlier, IHL was designed as a closed system, immune to
any and all justifications for breaking the law, including necessity, duress, or
force majeure50-all applicable in other contexts of international law.
The question of whether a similarly closed system applies to individuals
under ICL is somewhat more complex. Until the adoption of the Rome
Statute, the possible defenses for a defendant facing criminal charges for
violation of IHL rules were determined in a patchwork of decisions rendered
separately by the dedicated international tribunals and domestic courts. For
the most part, necessity claims invoked by defendants related to military
necessity or a variation on a claim of duress, as was the case in the German
industrialist trials in Nuremberg (accused of using slave labor) 51 or the
Erdemovic case in the ICTY (where a soldier was threatened with death if he
were to maintain his refusal to execute civilians). 52 The somewhat-related
claim of good motive was rejected by courts, as were claims of troubled
conscience or kind gestures. In the famous case of Ernst von Weizsaecker, the
German State Secretary who claimed he had secretly resisted Hitler, the court
required that the defendant demonstrate that "he did all that lay in his power to
frustrate a policy which outwardly he appeared to support." 53 As he had failed
to make this showing, he was found guilty. Where trials were conducted by
ordinary domestic courts, the latter similarly applied their own general
criminal paradigms of necessity or duress to determine culpability of
individual offenders.
54
The negotiation of the Rome Statute required a comprehensive decision
as to which exemptions from responsibility for war crimes (or crimes against
humanity) should be legally recognized. The list of possible defenses that the
Statute ultimately incorporated is more limited than that offered by most
national penal codes. This was in part a reflection of the notion that the crimes
that the ICC was meant to adjudicate were the most egregious and
indefensible of crimes, and that any attempt to justify or excuse them was
50. Draft Articles, supra note 33.
51. The defendants argued that they were under orders from the Nazi regime. United States v.
Krauch (The I.G. Farben Case), in 7-8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 10, at 1 (1942); see 8 id. at 1055-56. The Farben decision
clarified that the defense of necessity was not available in those instances in which "the party seeking to
invoke it was, himself, responsible for the existence or execution of such order or decree, or where his
participation went beyond the requirements thereof, or was the result of his own initiative." Id. at 1179.
However, in the case of United States v. Flick, two defendants were acquitted from a similar offense as
the Tribunal accepted their claims that they had lived in a "reign of terror" that compelled them to
follow orders and meet specific quotas. See United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), in 6 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra, at 1187, 1199-1202.
52. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement, para. 19 (Oct. 7, 1997)
(finding that "duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against
humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings").
53. United States v. Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), in 12-14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
supra note 51, at I (1950); see 14 id. at 356.
54. Matthew Lippman, Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of
the Humanitarian Law of War, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 92-93 (1996).
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morally dubious. 55 Another reason was the difficulty in reconciling conceptual
differences existing in various legal systems with regard to exemptions or
excuses from criminal responsibility.
56
A necessity defense parallel to one recognized by most domestic
systems of law was considered during the Rome Statute negotiations but was
left out of the final text.57 Instead, Article 31(l)(d) of the Statute58 included
what is understood to be a tortuous combination of duress and necessity (with
some elements of self-defense), much to the dismay of several scholars.
59
Despite contrary earlier drafts, the combined defense was ultimately made
available even for murder charges in wartime.
60
Although interpreted by scholars as granting more exemption to
defendants than the classic necessity defense, 61 Article 31(l)(d) certainly does
not include a choice-of-evils justification of the type I am interested in here.
55. Albin Eser, Article 31: Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE 863, 869 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).
56. Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 189, 206 (Roy S. Lee
ed., 1999).
57. Note that I refer here to the necessity defense in its traditional, domestic-law meaning. A
general defense of military necessity was predictably left out of the Statute. Military necessity was
recognized only where its absence was already incorporated into the elements of crime, such as in the
case of the war crime of "[e]xtensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly." Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 8(2)(a)(iv); see
Eser, supra note 55, at 870.
58. The text of the Article is as follows:
In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this
Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's
conduct:
(d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death
or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another
person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat,
provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one
sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be[:]
(i) Made by other persons; or
(ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person's control.
Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 3 l(l).
59. ILIAS BANTEKAS & SUSAN NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 135 (2d ed. 2003). Eser
described Article 31(l)(d) as an "ill-guided and lastly failed attempt . . . to combine two different
concepts: (justifying) 'necessity' and (merely excusing) 'duress."' Eser, supra note 55, at 883. A
different kind of criticism also arose with regard to the choice of making necessity grounds for
exoneration instead of mitigating circumstances for criminal responsibility, see Enrico Mezzetti,
Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility, in 2 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 143, 167 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 2004).
60. Saland, supra note 56, at 189, 208.
61. As Albin Eser describes it:
[T]his subjective conception of the "lesser evil"-principle is an integral element of this
defence: different from classical "necessity" which justifies actions that save the greater
good at the cost of the minor, and different from classical "duress" which would grant an
excuse regardless of the greater or lesser harm, if the person could not be fairly expected
to withstand the threat, this phrase could well be understood as drawing a line in-
between: on the one hand requiring less than justifying "necessity" would afford, and on
the other hand requiring more than excusing "duress" would be satisfied with. Thus, only
applying a subjective proportionality test to the accused's conduct would pursue the
unprecedented historic attempt to reconcile necessity and duress in one provision.
Eser, supra note 55, at 887 (citations omitted).
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Specifically, there is a requirement that the defendant acted in response to
circumstances that were imposed upon him or her (implying also that there
was no reasonable alternative to causing the harm). These actions must be
either brought about by other persons or constituted by circumstances beyond
the defendant's control. Article 3 l(1)(d) explicitly rules out the possibility of
successfully invoking a humanitarian necessity justification in other cases. In
particular, most commentators' understanding is that the necessity discussed
in Article 3 l(1)(d) is military necessity, 62 i.e., situations where the laws of war
are violated in order to promote the violator's own interests in prosecuting the
war. This is not the pure humanitarian necessity that is the subject of this
study.
There is some theoretical possibility that broader arguments of necessity
could be made under Article 3 1(3) of the Statute, which authorizes the court to
"consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than those
referred to in paragraph I where such a ground is derived from applicable law
as set forth in article 21 .63 Article 31(3) was originally designed to leave the
door open for other defenses that were considered during the negotiations, but
were ultimately neither incorporated nor explicitly rejected, especially
reprisals and military necessity (the latter not being explicitly incorporated
into the Statute, but possibly recognized under Article 31(l)(d) as discussed
above). 64 It is therefore highly unlikely that any notion of a choice of evils not
recognized in any of the sources of law enumerated in Article 2 1, which are to
guide the court in its work, will be recognized by the court.
Under the Rome Statute, the ICC prosecutor enjoys some prosecutorial
discretion, 65 which he ostensibly could exercise if circumstances of
humanitarian justification do arise, but this is outside the contours of what
IHL dictates or accepts. Moreover, assuming that necessity considerations will
be taken into account by the prosecutor anyway, an official doctrine of
humanitarian necessity would make such considerations clear and transparent,
rather than opaque. In addition, unlike in domestic systems of law, no pardon
is possible if the prosecutor decides to pursue the case.
To summarize, the humanitarian necessity justification I propose differs
from the defenses currently available in ICL in that it contemplates an
exemption from criminal responsibility where the actor, faced with a choice of
evils, voluntarily commits a violation of IHL to minimize humanitarian
suffering. The actor need not be facing an imminent threat to himself or
another (as with duress or self-defense), nor is he allowed any concessions for
acts taken in furtherance of his own interests (as with military necessity).
Rather, the humanitarian necessity justification would offer grounds for
exoneration when an actor selects an illegal course of action because, in the
circumstances, the prohibited approach would do less damage to the values
IHL seeks to protect than would any licit alternative. In other words, it would
defend the commission of the lesser evil as judged by IHL's own standards.
62. Mezzetti, supra note 59, at 151-54.
63. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 31(3).
64. GERHARD WERLE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 163 (2005); Eser,
supra note 55, at 891-93.
65. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 53.
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III. THREE CASE STUDIES
Before suggesting and evaluating possible motivations for the rejection
of a choice-of-evils justification in IHL and ICL, I turn to a demonstration of
the possible workings of such a justification in practice. I choose three
examples in which an actor-a state or individual-violated an absolute
prohibition under the laws of war. In all three cases, an actor could have
chosen not to violate the prohibition and pursue a lawful course of action
instead. The lawful course of action, so the actors believed, would have been
expected to cause greater harm than the unlawful one.
In the first case-the Early Warning Procedure-the Israeli High Court
of Justice upheld the legal prohibition against the employment of civilians in
an occupied territory by the occupation forces. The second case-torture for
interrogational purposes-has been the subject of a heated debate among
scholars, policymakers, and politicians. Other than the Israeli HCJ,66 which
was ready to recognize a post facto necessity justification under domestic
criminal law for the use of "moderate physical pressure" (considered by most
human rights organizations as a euphemism for torture), no other court has
officially recognized the legality of torture under any circumstances. 67 And
finally, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, one of the most notorious
acts of war ever committed and still the subject of much moral, political, and
legal controversy: although the attacks were never judged by an international
tribunal, in 1963 a Japanese court found them to be in clear violation of IHL,
even if the claimants could not succeed in their claim against the Japanese
government for lack of a cause of action, or against the United States for lack
of jurisdiction.
A. The "Early Warning Procedure"
In the course of the second Intifada in the occupied Palestinian
Territories, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issued the Early Warning
Procedure, colloquially known as the "Neighbor Procedure." The rationale for
the procedure was laid out in an IDF directive:
"'Early Warning' is an operational procedure, employed in operations to arrest wanted
persons, allowing solicitation of a local Palestinian resident's assistance in order to
minimize the danger of wounding innocent civilians and the wanted persons themselves
(allowing their arrest without bloodshed). Assistance by a local resident is intended to
grant an early warning to the residents of the house, in order to allow the innocent to
66. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel (Sept. 6, 1999), reprinted in
38 I.L.M. 1471, 1486-88 (1999), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/94/000/051/a09/
94051000.a09.pdf.
67. See, for instance, Gafgen v. Germany, a recently delivered decision by the European Court
of Human Rights, which addressed the conduct of German police officers who threatened to torture a
suspect if he did not disclose the whereabouts of a boy he had kidnapped. The Court underlined the
absolute nature of the prohibition on torture or ill treatment, irrespective of the conduct of the person
concerned and even if the purpose of the ill treatment was to extract information in order to save a
person's life. Gafgen v. Germany, App. No. 22978/05, 2008 WL 5485767 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 30, 2008).
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leave the building and the wanted persons to turn themselves in, before it becomes
necessary to use force, which is liable to endanger human life."
68
The Procedure's guidelines emphasized that Palestinians could not be
coerced to assist the IDF in an arrest (including an express emphasis to the
soldiers that the civilian population had no obligation to assist the IDF in
warning civilians of attack), and that no Palestinian was to be asked for
assistance in circumstances that were likely to endanger his life. The
assistance of women, children, the elderly or the disabled was not to be
solicited under any circumstances. In addition, Early Warning was not to be
employed where there was another effective way to achieve the objective.69
The Early Warning Procedure replaced a set of earlier practices that
were much more sweeping in their reliance on the local population for
military purposes. A group of human rights organizations in Israel challenged
the legality of these practices before the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ),7 °
claiming that IDF practices had entailed the use of Palestinian civilians as
human shields and hostages, and that these practices were in violation of IHL
rules on the protection of civilians in war and in occupied territories. The
petitioners described cases in which Palestinian residents were forced to scan
buildings suspected of being booby-trapped, or walk through certain areas
ahead of the security forces in order to find suspected persons. The petitioners
alleged the IDF interrogated local residents about the presence of wanted
persons and weapons under threat of bodily injury or death should the
residents fail to answer. They also cited reports that the IDF used local
residents as shields against attacks on forces and took relatives of suspected
Palestinians hostage in order to ensure the suspects' arrest.
Following the submission of the original petition, the state attorney
declared that the IDF had issued an unequivocal order strictly forbidding all
forces from using civilians as human shields or hostages, or otherwise in any
situation that might expose civilians to physical danger. However, the
response also indicated that the state did not rule out the possibility of
requesting the local population to assist in situations where this would help to
avoid greater harm to local residents, soldiers, and property, 71 including the
Early Warning Procedure, as detailed above. The petitioners then revised their
original petition in order to challenge this new procedure, 72 which they
claimed still violated IHL.
The petitioners pointed to Articles 3, 8, 27, 28, 47 and 51 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, as well as to Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol 1,74
which forbid the taking of civilians as hostages, employing violence against
civilians or threatening civilians with violence, using civilians as a protective
shield, and forcing civilians to serve in the occupying power's armed forces.
68. HCJ 3799/02 Adalah v. GOC Central Command, IDF para. 5 (June 23, 2005), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/02/990/037/a32/02037990.a32.pdf (quoting Israeli Defense Forces,
Operational Directive, Early Warning (Nov. 26, 2002)).
69. Id. paras. 6-7.
70. The original Adalah petition was submitted on May 5, 2002.
71. HCJ 3799/02 Adalah, para. 3.
72. Id. para. 4.
73. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, arts. 3, 8, 27, 28, 47, 51.
74. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 1, art. 51.
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Specifically, the petitioners argued that the Early Warning Procedure put the
uninvolved civilian in real danger; that there was no way to ensure that the
consent given by him was a true and free one; that regardless of the genuine
nature of the consent, civilians could not waive their rights under IHL, 7
including the right not to be used for the military needs of the occupying
army; that the Procedure violated the protected civilian's dignity, as it forced
him to be used against the side to which he belonged; and finally, that the
Procedure violated the principle of proportionality, as the same objective
76
could be reached by using a simple audio amplification.
Responding to the petitioners, the IDF emphasized the benefits arising
from the use of the Procedure. It argued that the Procedure increased the
probability of a quiet and peaceful arrest, thereby greatly reducing the risk for
the arresting forces as well as for the suspects, their families and neighbors.
When the forces believe that a loudspeaker or any other alternative would be
as effective as the Procedure, they must use these alternatives. But these
alternatives are not always viable; the use of loudspeakers, for instance, runs
the risk of drawing wide attention to the arrest from the adjacent streets, thus
increasing the probability of escalation and the need to use force.77 The IDF
also argued that "in hundreds of ... cases in which the procedure was used, no
complaints whatsoever were made regarding its use." 78 In only one
exceptional incident was a resident killed (by the suspect who had mistakenly
believed him to be an Israeli security official).79 On the whole, according to
the IDF, the Procedure was in fact perfectly compatible with the fundamental
principles of IHL, which required that every precaution be taken during the
planning and execution of a military operation to minimize collateral damage
to innocent civilians.
80
A panel of three justices unanimously accepted the petitioners'
arguments under international law and Israeli constitutional and administrative
law. President Barak delivered the opinion, in which Vice President Cheshin
and Justice Beinisch concurred. President Barak reiterated the IHL prohibition
on using the civilian population for the military needs of the occupying army,
and also the obligation to distance innocent civilians from the zone of
hostilities .8 It was therefore clearly unlawful to force a local resident to relay
an early warning to a suspected person.
As for consenting residents, even though the law was less clear, in
balancing the consideration for the lives of innocent civilians and the safety of
the security forces on the one hand against the life and dignity of the
consenting resident on the other hand,82 President Barak found that the scales
75. Geneva Convention IV states: "Protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in
part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention .... Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 26, art. 8.
76. HCJ 3799/02 Adalah, paras. 13-15.
77. Id. para. 18.
78. Id. para. 19.
79. Press Release, B'Tselem, iDF is Responsible for Death of "Human Shield" (Aug. 14,
2002), http://www.btselem.org/english/PressReleases/20020814.asp.
80. HCJ 3799/02 Adalah, para. 17.
81. Id. para 24.
82. This balancing test was drawn from Barak's own jurisprudence of Israeli constitutional
and administrative law; it is unclear that IHL itself would accommodate such a balancing test. Amichai
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tipped against the Procedure. He emphasized the legal prohibitions on using
the civilian population for the military needs of the occupying army and on
using local residents as human shields. 83 President Barak added that given the
power disparity between the parties, there was never a way of telling whether
consent was free or not. 84 President Barak also found that it could not be
ensured in advance that the relaying of a warning would not in fact endanger
the local resident: "The ability to properly estimate the existence of danger is
difficult in combat conditions, and a procedure should not be based on the
need to assume lack of danger ... ,85 Ultimately, President Barak concluded,
the procedure "comes too close to the normative 'nucleus' of the forbidden,
and is found in the relatively grey area (the penumbra) of the improper."
86
Vice President Cheshin opened his concurring decision with much
agonizing:
The subject is a difficult one. Most difficult. So difficult is it, that a judge might ask
himself why he chose the calling of the judiciary, and not of another profession, to be
busy with. Woe is me, for I answer to my creator; woe is me, with my conflicting
inclinations .... No matter which solution I choose, the time will come that I will regret
my choice. Indeed, there is no clear legal rule to show us the way, and I shall decide
according to my own way of legal reasoning.
87
Vice President Cheshin expressed concern about the "temptation to slide" and
the finding of justification to use this Procedure too early. He added that the
element of routine erodes the sensitivity and caution that are required for the
lawful performance of this Procedure. At the very end of his decision, Vice
President Cheshin mentioned the 1999 HCJ decision on coercive
interrogations, which, while deeming torture unlawful, nevertheless left some
room for it under a post facto necessity defense for the interrogators: "Yet it is
the ex ante and ex post formula, limited as it may be, which is likely to assist
us, even if only partially." 88 By this admission, Vice President Cheshin
effectively opened the door to a post facto necessity exception to the general
prohibition on conscripting civilians to the armed forces of the occupier.
The Court never addressed the question of whether a mixed concern for
the wellbeing of Palestinian civilians and the safety of the Israeli security
forces was a valid one, or whether the only valid concern could be for
Palestinians. From the tone of the Court's reasoning it might, in fact, seem
that the former possibility troubled the Court-that the security forces would
articulate their concern as one for the well-being of the Palestinian residents,
while in fact they were concerned only or predominantly with their own
safety.
The Israeli government later petitioned the HCJ requesting a further
hearing, claiming that the full effect of President Barak's decision would
Cohen & Yuval Shany, A Development of Modest Proportions: The Application of the Principle of
Proportionality in the Targeted Killings Case, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 310 (2007).
83. HCJ 3799/02 Adalah, para. 24.
84. Id. Justice Beinisch, in her concurring opinion, also stressed that both the consent and lack
of danger requirements were simply unrealistic. Id. para. 5 (Beinisch, J., concurring).
85. Id. para. 24 (judgment).
86. Id. para. 25.
87. Id. para. I (Cheshin, Vice President, concurring).
88. Id. para. 8.
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prohibit requesting civilians' assistance in negotiating between wanted
persons and the security forces, 89 helping intelligence operations, or even
helping to serve humanitarian aid in a combat zone. The request was denied. 90
According to B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights NGO, in the course of
arrest operations carried out in the West Bank in 2007-that is, after the Early
Warning Procedure had been abandoned for illegality-fifty Palestinians were
killed, nineteen of whom were not the intended target of arrest.9 1 Although it
is impossible to assess how many of the nineteen could have been spared had
the Early Warning Procedure been applied, it is conceivable that some might
have been.
B. Torture
A 2008 New York Times article on the CIA interrogation program told
the story of Deuce Martinez, a CIA interrogator who was successful in
extracting confessions and intelligence from captured al-Qaeda mastermind,
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Martinez did not employ any violent means or
threats against Mohammad, but instead managed to build a personal
relationship with him. Before being interrogated by Martinez, Mohammed had
been subjected to violence and harsh internment conditions, including a
hundred instances of waterboarding over a period of two weeks, by other CIA
agents. Scott Shane, the New York Times correspondent, accurately summed
up the question:
Mr. Martinez's success at building a rapport with the most ruthless of terrorists goes to
the heart of the interrogation debate. Did it suggest that traditional methods alone might
have obtained the same information or more? Or did Mr. Mohammed talk so expansively
because he feared more of the brutal treatment he had already endured?
92
Torture under international law is
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity.
93
There is debate about what types of physical or mental abuse amount to
torture, but there is agreement that at least some means that have been
89. As was the case when a group of Palestinian militants took refuge in the Church of
Nativity in Bethlehem, and local priests served as mediators, going between the IDF forces laying siege
and the besieged militants. See Moty Cristal, Negotiating Under the Cross: The Story of the Forty Day
Siege of the Church of Nativity, 8 INT'L NEGOTIATION 549 (2003).
90. HCJFH 10739/05 Minister of Defense v. Adalah (Feb. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.adalah.org/features/humshields/diyun-nosaf-d.pdf (translated from Hebrew to English by
author).
91. B'Tselem, Use of Firearms: Data Report, http://www.btselem.org/English/Firearms (last
visited Nov. 5, 2009).
92. Scott Shane, Inside a 9/11 Mastermind's Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at A1.
93. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113.
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employed by state agents cannot be regarded as anything but torture: brutal
beating, sexual attacks and humiliations, burning with hot iron or cigarettes,
electric shocking, biting or tearing by dogs, force-feeding human excrement
and urine, or the injection of pain-inducing chemicals into the body.
94
The prohibition on torture under international law is absolute. Article
2(2) of the Convention Against Torture specifically prohibits any derogation
from it, under any and all circumstances. 95 Corresponding prohibitions on
torture are found in the Fourth Geneva Convention (in relation to civilians)
and in the Third Geneva Convention (in relation to POWs), as well as in the
1977 Additional Protocols. The prohibition on torture is considered jus
cogens-a peremptory norm that cannot be overridden or derogated from by
any other norm of international law.
Extensive literature has been dedicated to the origins of the prohibition
on torture (as on some of the inherent value-contradictions the prohibition
contains); the justification for accepting execution, but not torture; the
justification for permitting the death of innocent civilians but not the torture of
a person who is actively engaged in harming the innocent, sometimes in great
numbers. 96 A deep moral aversion, a normative and aesthetic revulsion, as
well as a number of institutional concerns (the type of which I address in the
next Section), all work together to make the torturer an outcast of the
normative international community.
Nevertheless, in the prolific debates on torture since 9/11, there seems to
be some agreement (although by no means a consensus 97) that under one
unique circumstance-the "ticking bomb" scenario-torture may be justified
if it is conducted for the sole purpose of obtaining information essential for
stopping an imminent deadly attack and unavailable through other channels.
98
There also seems to be wide support, however, for the concern that this
justifiable exception might be dangerously exploited and employed in
numerous cases that are not true situations of "ticking bombs." Indeed, these
94. Matthew Lippman, The Protection of Universal Human Rights: The Problem of Torture,
UNIVERSAL HUM. RTS., Oct.-Dec. 1979, at 25, 33-35.
95. The full text is: "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture." Convention Against Torture, supra note 93, art. 2(2). The U.N. Committee
Against Torture emphasized that countries (in that context, Israel) were "precluded from raising before
this Committee exceptional circumstances as justification for acts prohibited by article I of the
Convention. This is plainly expressed in article 2 of the Convention." Comm. Against Torture,
Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Torture: Israel, 258, U.N. Doc. A/52/44 (Sept. 10,
1997).
96. See, e.g., Johan D. van der Vyver, Torture as a Crime Under International Law, 67 ALB.
L. REv. 427 (2003).
97. See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1714-15 (2005) (submitting that even in a scenario of a nuclear "ticking-bomb,"
torture would be unjustified). Jeff McMahan argues that even though torture may be morally justified
under some circumstances, the rarity of those circumstances coupled by concerns for abuse in different
circumstances warrant not recognizing any exception under the law. Jeff McMahan, Torture, Morality,
and Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 241 (2006).
98. Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment " and "Postcommitment ": The Ban on Torture in the
Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013 (2003); see also Alan Dershowitz, Opinion, Democrats
and Waterboarding, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?
id= 110010832 (noting the statements of Bill Clinton and John McCain on the use of torture in a "ticking
bomb" scenario).
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fears were borne out with the revelation of the "torture memos" promulgated
by Department of Justice legal advisers during the early years of the Bush
Administration. The memos' authorization of various harsh interrogation
techniques, including simulated drowning and confinement with insects,
extended the use of physical coercion well beyond the paradigmatic case of
extreme necessity.
99
Among those supporting a narrow legal exception for torture, debates
arose as to the proper legal means for its allowance. Alan Dershowitz
suggested empowering judges to issue torture warrants in the name of
transparency and accountability.10 0 Richard Posner, conversely, preferred to
know that some torture was being practiced unofficially, without giving it the
imprimatur of lawfulness. 0 1 Oren Gross argued for an "official disobedience"
model, by which the prohibition on torture would be absolute but officials
(and the general public) would depart from it in the necessary case and face
the consequences. 10 2 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule rejected the "official
disobedience" model and argued instead for ex ante regulation that would
provide the right set of incentives for officials.'0 3 The Israeli HCJ ruled that a
torturer may enjoy a post facto necessity justification that would protect him
from criminal liability in the right case, 104 while others challenged the
applicability of the necessity paradigm and argued that if at all, self-defense
was a more accurate framework for thinking about this problem. 1 5 None of
these suggestions would exonerate the torturing state or agent under IHL, and
it is questionable whether a torturer could successfully invoke the existing
justifications under the Rome Statute to escape criminal liability if on trial
before the ICC.
The humanitarian necessity justification encounters several difficulties
when one tries to apply it to the act of torture, as torture is conceptually
different on several counts from the two other cases I discuss here. Most
fundamentally, in the Early Warning Procedure case, a concern, however
mixed, was demonstrated for the well-being of the enemy's people. The same
99. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 2009, at Al.
100. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 141, 158-63 (2002) [hereinafter
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS]; Alan M. Dershowitz, Is It Necessary To Apply "Physical
Pressure " to Terrorists-and To Lie About It?, 23 ISR. L. REv. 192, 198 (1989) [hereinafter Dershowitz,
Is It Necessary]. Sanford Levinson has also expressed support for this idea. Sanford Levinson, The
Debate on Torture, DISSENT, Summer 2003, at 79, 86-88.
101. Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION
291, 291-98 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); cf Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 124
(1978) (describing, but ultimately rejecting, the argument that debates about the permissibility of torture
should not be discussed publicly).
102. Gross, supra note 15, at 1519-26.
103. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 MICH.
L. REv. 671,699-704 (2006).
104. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel para. 40 (Sept. 6, 1999),
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1486-88 (1999), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/94/000/
05 I/a09/94051000.a09.pdf. Henry Shue also seems to accept the necessity defense as appropriate. See
Shue, supra note 101, at 143.
105. McMahan, supra note 97, at 244 (supporting the self-defense justification); Michael S.
Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REv. 280, 323 (1989) (supporting the self-defense
justification); Elaine Scarry, Five Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz, in TORTURE, supra note
101, at 281 (challenging the necessity paradigm).
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may be said, to a different degree, about the singular case of the atomic bomb
on Hiroshima. The classic case of torture of a suspected terrorist or POW,
conversely, is intended to benefit the torturer's own people, be they military or
civilian.
Another fundamental difference between the case of torture and the
other cases discussed here has to do with the identity of the victim. The Early
Warning Procedure concerns an uninvolved civilian who is asked to assist the
occupying forces. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, hundreds of thousands of
innocent civilians were targeted. When scholars address the possibility of
torturing for informational purposes, the assumption is that the torture is
inflicted not on an innocent civilian, but rather on someone who possesses the
information due to a direct involvement in hostile actions. Almost no one
approves of the idea of torturing the child of a terrorist in order to gain
leverage over the child's parent, 10 6 and only some wrestle with the possibility
of torturing a terrorist's wife, who is otherwise innocent but happens to
possess the information necessary to avert an imminent attack. 107 In other
words, the torture under consideration is that of a person who is to some
degree "culpable," and this culpability is what seems to be a key argument for
those willing to uphold torture under some circumstances. 108 In this sense, the
torture of a terrorist resembles more the assassination of a rogue leader, itself
illegal under international law. In fact, argues Miriam Gur-Arye, the emphasis
on the culpability of the torture victim is why any justification of torture is
more accurately made under a self-defense paradigm than a necessity one, as
the focus of any justifiable act of torture would be to protect citizens from an
attack.1°9
Further agreement seems to instruct that while torture may be narrowly
legitimate for interrogational purposes, it is never legitimate for any other
purpose, as when used to make a person act or refrain from acting in a certain
way.''
0
Still, if torture can, however narrowly, be justified for the obtainment of
otherwise unavailable information that would save the lives of innocent
people, why would it be unjustified, if it leads to the same result-the saving
of innocent people-by different means? Consider the hypothetical of
torturing Saddam Hussein's two sons (who were heavily involved in his dark
regime, and notorious torturers themselves), or his wife (who was not), as a
106. Some came very close to it: CIA expert Ron Suskind described how the CIA kidnapped
the two young children, aged seven and nine, of al-Qaeda senior operative, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed,
and threatened Mohammed with grievous injury to his children if he did not cooperate. Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed seemed to have been unimpressed by the threat. See The President Knows More Than He
Lets On: Interview with Terror Expert Ron Suskind, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Oct. 27, 2006, http://www.spiegel.
de/intemational/0,1518,445117,00.html. And John Yoo reportedly argued that if the President deemed it
was necessary to crush the testicles of a child of a suspect in custody, then there was no law to stop him.
Philip Watts, John Yoo-Presidential Powers Extend to Ordering Torture of Suspect's Child,
REVOLUTION, Dec. 30, 2005, http://revcom.us/a/028/john-yoo.html.
107. See Moore, supra note 105, at 292, 324.
108. See Tibor R. Machan, Exploring Extreme Violence (Torture), 21 J. SOC. PHIL. 92, 94
(1990) (arguing that torture might be justified only when "some measure of moral guilt is present or
highly probable on the part of the party about to experience the violence").
109. Miriam Gur-Arye, Can the War Against Terror Justify the Use of Force in Interrogations?
Reflections in Light of the Israeli Experience, in TORTURE, supra note 101, at 183, 191-95.
110. SeeShue, supranote 101,at 141.
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means of inducing Hussein to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait in the fall of
1990, after exhausting sanctions and other less violent alternatives. The
overriding impetus for such a deed would be protecting the lives of Iraqi and
Kuwaiti civilians and combatants, not just coalition forces. International law
would absolutely prohibit such a course of action, while allowing Operation
Desert Storm to continue under the authorization of Security Council
Resolution 678, inflicting thousands of Iraqi casualties.
It is interesting to note that anecdotal evidence (as it appears in
scholarship or political statements) shows that more people are willing to
publicly justify the bombings of Hiroshima or Nagasaki than the torture of
someone other than a suspected terrorist in a ticking-bomb scenario or any
torture conducted for noninformational purposes."' This means that for some
deep-seated, opaque reason, torture is perceived as an even greater outrage
against an absolute moral imperative than the intentional killing of a great
number of innocent people. In most people's moral intuition, torture is
perceived as an even more dehumanizing act than killing; perhaps because
killing is a common, accepted reality on the battlefield and torture is not or
should not be, even though injuries suffered on the battlefield may carry far
more devastating long-term physical and mental effects than those inflicted by
any kind of torture. It might also be because even more than the act of killing,
torture implies using a person as a means rather than an end. Torture is a more
personal act, an outrage performed on a known, identified person who is in
our hands, not the impersonal act of dropping a bomb on unnamed victims.
This last point is related to a concern that torture is harmful not only to the
victim but also to the perpetrator: torture debases, soils the very soul of the
torturer, whereas dropping a bomb is a "clean," necessary, banal act of war.'
12
It is also possible, however, that the reason for some, albeit limited
approval for Hiroshima but not for torture has less to do with any general
consistent moral position and more with the post facto practical calculation:
Hiroshima worked, while the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of
torture is, at best, mixed.1 13
Later in the Article, I identify possible reasons for prohibiting torture
altogether. To those who view the absolute objection to torture as a moral
imperative, no humanitarian benefit would ever warrant the use of such means
and no humanitarian necessity justification could ever exempt the torturer.
The humanitarian necessity justification is essentially a utilitarian framework.
It could apply to cases of torture only if we were willing to examine such
cases through a utilitarian prism, assessing their practical feasibility, expected
value, direct and indirect costs, and foreseen or unforeseen risks. If we do, it is
Ill. For a recent collection of essays refuting what the writers call the "Hiroshima revisionist"
view of history-namely, that the atomic bombings were unnecessary-see generally HIROSHIMA IN
HISTORY: THE MYTHS OF REVISIONISM (Robert James Maddox ed., 2007).
112. See David Sussman, What's Wrong with Torture?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1, 13-14 (2005)
(discussing the harms of war, which we accept as a given, against the harms of torture, to which we
object).
113. On the empirics of torture's effectiveness, see Jeannine Bell, Behind this Mortal Bone:
The (In)Effectiveness of Torture, 83 IND. L.J. 339 (2008). See also Anne Applebaum, The Torture Myth,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at A21 (examining some of the "overwhelmingly negative evidence"
regarding the usefulness of torture for extracting accurate information).
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not impossible to conceive of a rare hypothetical where torture would be
justifiable provided its humanitarian benefit could be proved. I later explain
why it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove such benefit, but the
theoretical possibility remains.
In contrast to more common accounts of torture and necessity, however,
I argue that it is not the identity of the victim of torture (guilty or innocent)
nor the immediate purpose of the torture (interrogational or
noninterrogational), but the identity of the potential victims of the attack we
seek to avert that should form our judgment of the permissibility of torture in
any particular case.
C. Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Around 8:15 a.m. on August 6, 1945, a B-29 bomber piloted by Colonel Tibbetts, U.S.
Army Air Forces, dropped a uranium bomb on Hiroshima under the orders of U.S.
President H.S. Truman, and around 11:02 a.m. on the 9th of the same month, a B-29
bomber piloted by Major Sweeney, U.S. Army Air Forces, dropped a plutonium bomb on
Nagasaki under the orders of U.S. President Truman. These bombs ... exploded in the
air. A furious bomb-shell blast with a flash, and both in Hiroshima and in Nagasaki
almost all buildings in the cities collapsed. Simultaneously, fire broke out everywhere;
and all people who were within a radius of some four kilometers of the epicenter were
killed in an instant without distinction of age or sex. A large number of people elsewhere
were burned on the skin by the flash, and others, bathed with the radiant rays, suffered
from so-called atomic bomb injury. The number of killed and wounded, to say the least,
amounted to more than 70,000 and 50,000 respectively, in Hiroshima, and to more than
20,000 and 40,000 respectively, in Nagasaki.
We must say that the atomic bomb is really cruel weapon [sic]." 
4
In December 1963, the District Court of Tokyo delivered its decision in
a suit filed by five individuals against the Japanese government. The plaintiffs
and their relatives suffered direct injuries from the bombings. They were
barred from suing the U.S. government for various reasons, including the
terms of the San Francisco Treaty of Peace, 15 and therefore named their own
government as the respondent. The district court found that the bombings
were in violation of the laws of war at the time, especially the prohibitions on
the use of poisonous weapons and on conducting indiscriminate attacks but
ruled that the plaintiffs could not recover damages from the Japanese
government.116 Neither side appealed the decision.
The protracted devastation that was brought about by the nuclear
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has long stood as a symbol for
everything heinous in war. The historical debate over the morality, legitimacy,
and necessity of the bombings is still as contentious today as global nuclear
politics. As recently as June 2007, it sparked a political flare-up when Japan's
114. Shimoda v. State, 355 HANREI JInO 17 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Dec. 7, 1963), translation
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/WebCASE!OpenView&Start-I&Count-300&Expand=23.
For a thorough review and analysis of the Shimoda judgment, see Richard A. Falk, The Shimoda Case:
A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 759 (1965).
115. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45.
116. It is interesting to note, however, that several officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry
questioned the court's finding that the atomic bombing was illegal, on grounds that there was no directly
applicable positive rule of international law that would have prohibited the act. 2 ANTHONY A.
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 374-75 (1997).
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First Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma declared that the nuclear attacks were
an inevitable way to end World War II. Japan's then-Prime Minister, Shinzo
Abe, apologized to Hiroshima survivors over Kyuma's remark, and Kyuma
himself resigned shortly afterwards. The instincts on both sides of this debate
are very strong. The strict mathematical calculation of the number of lives
spared by the bombings leads to the perception of the bombings as inevitable.
On the other hand, there is a deep revulsion against the callousness of a strict
mathematical calculation that leads to the killing and maiming of tens of
thousands of civilians, and three days later, of tens of thousands of civilians
more.
Estimates of the casualties inflicted by the bombings vary greatly-
partly due to the lingering radiation and its long-term effects-and range from
one hundred thirty thousand to more than three hundred fifty thousand. The
plaintiffs in Shimoda listed two hundred sixty thousand killed in Hiroshima
and 73,884 in Nagasaki, but the court preferred, instead, the Japanese
government's more moderate estimates. There is no disagreement that the vast
majority of casualties were civilians.
Present-day IHL prohibits the intentional targeting of civilians,
indiscriminate attacks on mixed civilian-military targets that result in
disproportionate harm to civilians, and the use of poisonous weapons.1 7 Still,
in an ambiguous and convoluted advisory opinion rendered in 1996, the
International Court of Justice stopped short of declaring the use of nuclear
weapons illegal at all times. Instead, it left the door open to the use of atom
bombs by a state facing destruction if that state deemed it essential for its self-
preservation.! s Debates continue as to whether the 1945 attacks would have
been considered lawful then, or today. 119 In any case, much less debate
surrounds the carpet bombings of Dresden or Tokyo which resulted in even
more civilian casualties than those suffered in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
120
117. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51; Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, supra
note 28; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, supra note 28.
118. The question of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons was addressed by the ICJ in its
advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. See Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 263 (July 8).
119. John Bolton raised the possibility of being found guilty under the Rome Statute for the
atomic bombings as a justification for not joining the ICC. John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of
the International Criminal Court from America's Perspective, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 170
(2001).
120. Although as a general matter, the carpet-bombing of cities is clearly unlawful today,
Francisco Javier Guisdndez G6mez argues that
[i]n examining [the bombings of cities in World War fl] in the light of international
humanitarian law, it should be borne in mind that during the Second World War there
was no agreement, treaty, convention or any other instrument governing the protection of
the civilian population or civilian property, as the Conventions then in force dealt only
with the protection of the wounded and the sick on the battlefield and in naval warfare,
hospital ships, the laws and customs of war and the protection of prisoners of war.
Francisco Javier Guisindez G6mez, The Law of Air Warfare, 323 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 347, 360
(1998). Note that upon ratifying Additional Protocol I, the United Kingdom added a reservation with
regard to reprisals against civilian targets, which might, under some circumstances, excuse the deliberate
retaliatory attack on civilians. See Ratification of the Additional Protocols by the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 322 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 186, 189-90 (1998).
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The planned alternative to the atomic bombs was Operation
Downfall12 1 -a land invasion of Japan that the American military would have
pursued had the bombs not been dropped and Japan not surrendered. Such a
land invasion would have been deemed lawful (provided the invading forces
observed the laws of war throughout the offensive). In a memorandum
solicited by the Secretary of War on estimated casualties in an invasion of
Japan, notable physicist W.B. Shockley predicted:
[T]he Japanese dead and ineffectives at the time of defeat will exceed the corresponding
number for the Germans. In other words, we shall probably have to kill at least 5 to 10
million Japanese. This might cost us between 1.7 and 4 million casualties including
400,000 to 800,000 killed."'
An American land invasion of Okinawa a few months earlier, between
March and June of 1945, left over one hundred fifty thousand Japanese
civilians, about half of the civilian population of Okinawa, dead. 123 The
Emperor remained adamant in his refusal to surrender.
Note that there may have been a host of other, less destructive
alternatives to the two bombs as well as to Operation Downfall. These ranged
from a demonstration of an explosion somewhere in the desert, to an early
warning to the inhabitants of Hiroshima calling on them to evacuate, to even
peace negotiations to end the war. Deliberating the feasibility and workability
of these options exceeds the scope of this work, and I bracket them as possible
but theoretical alternatives that at the time had been debated to a lesser
extent.
124
In addition, other than winning the war in the Pacific, recent studies
have argued that the growing suspicion within the Truman Administration
toward the Soviet Union and the concern about a Soviet bomb was a strong
motivator in dropping the atomic bombs on Japan and demonstrating
American supremacy, possibly as leverage for inducing Moscow's
acquiescence in postwar American objectives.1 5 Indeed, there is considerable
121. For a detailed description and analysis of Operation Downfall, see REPORTS OF GENERAL
MACARTHUR: THE CAMPAIGNS OF MACARTHUR IN THE PACIFIC 395-430 (facsimile reprint 1994) (1966).
122. Memorandum from W.B. Shockley, Expert Consultant, Office of the Sec'y of War, to
Edward L. Bowles on the Estimated Casualties in an Invasion of Japan (July 21, 1945), reprinted in
MICHAEL KORT, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO HIROSHIMA AND THE BOMB 223 (2007). Critics claim these
numbers were excessively high and contrived by those who supported the bombings as an alternative to
the invasion. See Rufus E. Miles, Jr., Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Haifa Million American Lives
Saved, INT'L SECURITY, Autumn 1985, at 121.
123. HERBERT P. Bix, HIROHITO AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 485 (2000). Okinawa
casualties also totaled more than 12,000 American soldiers killed or missing, 38,000 wounded and more
than 107,000 Japanese and Okinawan conscripts killed. See id.; Hanson W. Baldwin, America at War:
Victory in the Pacific, FOREIGN AF., Oct. 1945, at 26, 29. Thousands of soldiers and commanders died
in mass suicides encouraged by the Japanese military. See Norimitsu Onishi, Japan Rewrites History,
but Can't Erase Memories, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 9, 2007, at 2.
124. See President Truman Did Not Understand, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 15, 1960, at
68 (providing a transcript of an interview with physicist Leo Szilard, who was involved in the
Manhattan project but then opposed the use of the bomb in Japan).
125. See, e.g., GAR ALPEROVITZ, THE DECISION TO USE THE BOMB AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF
AN A-MERICAN MYTH 147 (1995); ROBERT JAMES MADDOX, WEAPONS FOR VICTORY: THE HIROSHIMA
DECISION FIFTY YEARS LATER (1995).
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evidence that the Soviets themselves viewed this as the primary American
motivation for using the atomic bomb. 1
26
Discussing the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the
context of a "humanitarian justification" may very well appear an oxymoronic
undertaking. Any nuclear explosion, even in an empty space, touches on
humanity's most ancient fears of Armageddon and the end of days. The use of
nuclear weapons-extreme, indiscriminate, horrifically destructive
weapons-seems to stand in direct opposition to the most fundamental moral
principles, not only of the laws of war but of human discrimination and
judgment essential to our ideas of a "civilized" or even "acceptable" war. It is
perhaps for this reason that the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki have
attracted more attention and debate than the carpet bombings of Tokyo or the
siege on Leningrad, both of which caused more civilian casualties than those
brought upon by the nuclear attacks, 127 indeed, more than any other wartime
act in history. Many reasons support the exclusion of nuclear attacks from the
scope of what is considered human: the magnitude of annihilation wreaked by
such small physical effort over less than a minute; the defenselessness of those
attacked; the inability of the international community effectively to frustrate a
willing party from inflicting a nuclear holocaust; and the concern that a
repetition of Hiroshima and Nagasaki--or worse-would mark the beginning
of the end of the world. Neither the destruction brought upon Tokyo or
Dresden nor the siege on Leningrad was enough to amount to such intense and
timeless symbolism.
Certainly, the idea that the devastation wreaked upon the two Japanese
cities was a good thing, or even a necessary evil, is hard to digest. To claim
that it was requires us to engage in a gruesome and at least half-hypothetical
body count-to compare the actual devastation to the potential one of
Operation Downfall and ignore what we know of individual suffering. Such
an exercise requires us to accept the objectification-the
instrumentalization-of people, a treatment of humans as means to an end,
contrary to any humane moral instinct.
But the taboo surrounding any mathematical calculation of deliberate
killings necessarily detracts our attention from the would-be casualties of
Operation Downfall. Real victims are the only ones we can see and count.
Their tragedy is visible and certain. Imaginary victims are, by definition,
imaginary. The absolute rules of IHL exclude calculations that would allow us
to prefer the welfare of would-be victims. Consideration for the latter would
require us to accept, to some extent, the legitimacy of a deliberate infliction of
126. Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov allegedly thought "that the bomb dropped on
Hiroshima was aimed not at Japan, but ... at the Soviet Union"; several prominent Soviet physicists
were apparently of the same opinion. Pub. Broad. Serv., Vladislav Zubok on: The Soviet Reaction to
Hiroshima, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/filmmore/reference/interview/zubok l.
html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (transcribing a documentary called Race for the Superbomb, filmed in
1999).
127. On a single day, March 10, 1945, three hundred B-29s dropped incendiary bombs
(Operation Meetinghouse), destroying twenty-five percent of Tokyo and killing between 80,000 and
100,000 civilians. See JAMES CARROLL, A HOUSE OF WAR 94-95 (2007); Robert A. Pape, Why Japan
Surrendered, INT'L SECURITY, Autumn 1993, at 164. One estimate put the number of civilians perishing
in the course of the siege of Leningrad at around 1.2 million. See LISA A. KIRSCHENBAUM, THE LEGACY
OF THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD, 1941-1995, at 122 (2006).
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harm on innocent people in order to avoid the infliction-deliberate or
foreseen-of harm on still many more. We would have to accept, to some
extent, the instrumentalization of innocent people.
If we were to attempt to construct a lesser-evil justification for the
attacks more concretely, it might run something like this: more Japanese
civilians would have lost their lives in an American land invasion into
Japan-a lawful course of action in the midst of an armed conflict (and
provided other laws of war were also observed)-than in the nuclear
bombings. If this is so, then breaking the laws of war-that is, intentionally
targeting civilians-was likely to result in fewer Japanese civilian casualties
than following the laws of war; and it should therefore be upheld as lawful
under a humanitarian necessity justification. 28 This calculation most certainly
works if we add into it the lives of Japanese soldiers, even without taking into
account American soldiers. This type of justification resonates in the
judgment of Philippine justice Delfin Jaranilla, member of the Tokyo
Tribunal:
If a means is justified by an end, the use of the atomic bomb was justified for it brought
Japan to her knees and ended the horrible war. If the war had gone on longer, without the
use of the atomic bomb, how many more thousands and thousands of helpless men,
women and children would have needlessly died and suffered ... ?129
Whether or not a concern for Japanese lives-as opposed to a strict
military advantage and the sparing of American lives-was genuinely counted
among the motivations of the U.S. decisionmakers is under much debate and
varies in different narratives. Most historical reports of the deliberations in the
U.S. military and political quarters over Operation Downfall document the
primary concern for American lives. 130 But there is anecdotal evidence
suggesting that the decisionmakers were not oblivious to the effect of the
invasion and its alternatives on the Japanese. Secretary of Defense Stimson, in
an article in Harper's Magazine in February 1947, claimed that:
I felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisers, they
must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our
power to destroy the Empire. Such an effective shock would save many times the number
of lives, both American and Japanese, that it would cost.'
3
1
In the same article, he added:
The decision to use the atomic bomb was a decision that brought death to over a hundred
thousand Japanese. No explanation can change that fact and I do not wish to gloss it over.
But this deliberate, premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent choice. The
128. This exact argument has been made by R. John Pritchard. See R. John Pritchard, Truman
on Trial: Not Guilty, HIST. NEWS NETWORK, Aug. 3, 2001, http://hnn.us/articles/l76.html (arguing that
in finding Truman not guilty, "[t]he decisive point that does tip the balance for me is that these terrible
deeds which led to what has proved to be a durable peace were efficacious in doing so at far less cost in
human suffering on BOTH sides than would have been any policy that would not have involved conduct
generally prohibited in international law," thus suggesting that the atomic bombings were not illegal).
129. JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 473
(1999).
130. See, e.g., DENNIS D. WAINSTOCK, THE DECISION To DROP THE ATOMIC BOMB 67 (1996).
131. Henry L. Stimson, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, HARPER'S MAG., Feb. 1947, at
97, 101.
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destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fire
raids, and the strangling blockade; it ended the ghastly specter of a clash of great land
armies.
132
In a similar tone, then-Secretary of State, James Francis Byrnes,
claimed: "In these two raids there were many casualties but not nearly so
many as there would have been had our air force continued to drop incendiary
bombs on Japan's cities.
'' 33
President Truman himself, in a letter to Senator Richard B. Russell of
August 9, 1945 (after the bombing of Hiroshima), stated:
I know that Japan is a terribly cruel and uncivilized nation in warfare but I can't bring
myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same
manner .... My object is to save as many American lives as possible but I also have a
humane feeling for the women and children in Japan.
34
Oddly, from an entry in his personal diary, it seems that President
Truman believed Hiroshima to be a military target:
This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the
Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are
the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless
and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this
terrible bomb on the old capital or the new. He & I are in accord. The target will be a
purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender
and save lives. I'm sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance.'
35
And as a matter of historical anecdote, the B-29 Superfortress
responsible for the photographing mission in the attack on Hiroshima was
named by its senders Necessary Evil.
136
With hindsight, however, historian J. Samuel Walker argues that:
The sparing of forty-six thousand or twenty thousand or many fewer lives might well
have provided ample justification for using the bomb, but Truman and other high-level
officials did not choose to make a case on those grounds. Indeed, as James G. Hershberg
and Bernstein demonstrated, former government authorities consciously and artfully
constructed the history of the decision to discourage questions about it.'
37
Moreover, reports of the target-selection discussions reveal the reasons
for choosing Hiroshima, claiming it was a key military staging area with
132. Id. at 107.
133. James Francis Byrnes, Control of Atomic Energy, in SPEAKING FRANKLY 257, 264 (1947).
Obviously, relying on the number of casualties that would have been incurred through a sustained
campaign of incendiary bombings of Japanese cities is invalid for our present discussion of a
humanitarian justification, as such a campaign would clearly be unlawful today under IHL.
134. Letter from President Harry S. Truman to Senator Richard B. Russell (Aug. 9, 1945),
available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/bomb/arge/documents/pdfs/
9.pdf.
135. OFF THE REcoRD: THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 55-56 (Robert H. Ferrell
ed., 1980).
136. Dennis McLellan, George Marquardt, 84; Pilot of Plane Flying With Enola Gay on
Mission To Bomb Hiroshima, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2003, at B2 1.
137. J. Samuel Walker, The Decision To Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update, in
HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY AND MEMORY 11, 23 (Michael J. Hogan ed., 1996).
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geographical features that favored use of an atomic weapon over conventional
incendiary bombs. 1
38
The options of dropping the bomb on the Emperor's palace or on strict
"military targets" were debated and rejected for lack of sufficient strategic
effect. 39 And the Official Bombing Order of July 25, 1945, made no mention
of aiming at military targets or of attempting to avoid civilian casualties. 1
40
A key question with regard to the true motivations behind the decision to
use the bomb is why Nagasaki was bombed only three days after Hiroshima.
On August 9, President Truman made a radio public address, stating the
following:
The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military
base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the
killing of civilians. But that attack is only a warning of things to come. If Japan does not
surrender, bombs will have to be dropped on her war industries and, unfortunately,
thousands of civilian lives will be lost. I urge Japanese civilians to leave industrial cities
immediately, and save themselves from destruction.'
4 1
President Truman delivered his speech from the White House at 10 p.m.
Eastern Standard Time. By then, a second bomb had already been dropped on
Nagasaki.
There are some indications that the three-day delay was not intended to
give the Emperor time to consider his surrender, but was simply the time
needed to gather the additional amounts of plutonium necessary for the second
bomb and the next good weather break after August 6.142 Some commentators,
however, claim that radio messages and leaflets dropped by American planes
after the first bombing, warning of additional attacks, were ignored by the
Japanese government, which remained adamant in its refusal to accept the
Potsdam conditions for surrender. 143 It was only after hearing about the
second bomb on Nagasaki that Emperor Hirohito gave up demands for a
conditional surrender, with the exception of retaining the prerogatives of His
Majesty as a sovereign ruler.
It is thus extremely difficult to assess whether anything like the
humanitarian justification I suggest could in fact be applied in retrospect to
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Contradictory data and interpretations require us to
choose between various estimates of probable outcomes of different courses
138. See Memorandum from Major J. A. Derry & Dr. N.F. Ramsey to Major Gen. L.R. Groves
(May 12, 1945), available at http://www.dannen.com/decision/targets.html.
139. Id.
140. Gen. Thos. T. Handy, Official Bombing Order (July 25, 1945), available at
http://www.dannen.com/decision/handy.html.
141. Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference, I PUB. PAPERS 203,
212 (Aug. 9, 1945).
142. The Official Bombing Order of July 25, 1945, stipulated that the Air Force shall "deliver
its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 ....
Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff."
Handy, supra note 140; see also Office of History & Heritage Resources, U.S. Dep't of Energy, The
Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki, http://www.cfo.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/nagasaki.htm (last visited Nov.
30, 2009).
143. See Hubertus Hoffman, Hiroshima: Hubertus Hoffmann Meets the Only U.S. Officer on
Both A-Missions and One of His Victims, WORLD SECURITY NETWORK, Nov. 2, 2007,
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article-id = 15045.
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of action. Indeed, the inherent difficulty in any assessment of this kind may
very well be an arguable cause for excluding such calculations from the
battlefield, a point to which I return in the following Sections. The United
States knew neither the consequences of a land invasion nor the consequences
of an atomic explosion. Before the first nuclear test in New Mexico, scientists
took bets among them on the effects of the bomb, ranging from zero to the
destruction of New Mexico.'44 Some even predicted the incineration of Planet
Earth altogether (and were still willing to go through with the experiment!). 45
No one knew for sure what the weapon might actually do to a city or a
country.
Even though these devlopments could not offer definitive support for the
view that the bombings were indeed a lesser evil, it is interesting-even
surprising-to note that in the Shimoda case, the Japanese government was
ready to acknowledge that the bombings hastened the end of the war, thereby
reducing the number of casualties on both sides and achieving the belligerent
objective of unconditional surrender. In that case, the Japanese government
essentially adopted the official U.S. justification for the bombings, claiming
that "with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as a direct result,
Japan ceased further resistance and accepted the Potsdam Declaration."'
' 46
For all their immediate cruelty, it is highly possible that any
demonstrated willingness to justify the atomic attacks on the two Japanese
cities stems from their view as sui generis, highly contingent on the historical
and political circumstances existing at their time. Nonetheless, they present an
extreme case of a more general dilemma: could there ever be circumstances in
which the deliberate killing of civilians, in violation of IHL, should be upheld
as morally and legally justified? The current laws of war exclude this
possibility, preferring, instead, an absolutist prohibition on murder. And yet,
the lack of consensus around the condemnation of the bombing speaks to a
broader intuition that perhaps the laws of war should make room for such
cases, even if the room allowed is so narrow that ultimately it would preclude
the future use of nuclear weapons altogether.
IV. COMPARING DOMESTIC NECESSITY AND HUMANITARIAN NECESSITY
A close analogy to the humanitarian necessity paradigm in IHL may be
found in the necessity defense in domestic criminal law, which offers
exemption from criminal liability in exceptional cases where violating the law
caused a lesser harm than following it would have. As the following Section
demonstrates, the analogy is an imperfect one; and while it is useful for
comparison's sake, the domestic defense cannot be transposed onto the
international level without important modifications.
144. Office of History & Heritage Resources, U.S. Dep't of Energy, The Trinity Test,
http://www.cfo.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/trinity.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
145. The Nobel Prize-winning physicist Enrico Fermi offered to make a wager as to "'whether
or not the bomb would ignite the atmosphere, and if so, whether it would merely destroy New Mexico or
destroy the world."' Id.
146. Falk, supra note 114, at 765 (quoting Shimoda v. State, 355 HANREI JIHO 17 (Tokyo Dist.
Ct. Dec. 7, 1963), translation available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/WebCASE!OpenView&Start=-
l&Count=300&Expand=23).
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A. The Necessity Defense in Criminal Law
In his treatise on defenses in criminal law, Paul Robinson refers to
necessity as "the lesser evils defense," and states that it "always involves a
claim that application of the law defining the offense in the particular
situation would be inadvisable or even immoral. 147
The concept of necessity is well recognized in both common and civil
law traditions, 148 although there are important variances in its promulgation
and application. In some traditions, such as English common law, necessity
can never provide a defense to intentional homicide; in others, such as France
or Israel, the defense theoretically can be applied to any crime.149 Jurists also
differ on whether necessity is better classified as an excuse or as a
justification. In Canada, for example, necessity is considered an excuse, while
the German penal code in fact includes two variations of necessity, one an
excuse and the other a justification.1 50 Under the law of some U.S. states, it is
considered a justification-a classification that carries the normative message
that society does not only forgive the offender in the particular case, but
actually believes her actions are warranted.
In what follows, I offer an overview of the formal conditions of the
necessity justification in U.S. law, leaving aside prosecutorial discretion or
pardoning power, both of which affect how society actually treats necessity
justifications in practice. As this overview makes clear, the domestic paradigm
of necessity offers a much narrower exemption from criminal culpability than
the lesser-evil justification that is the subject of my study here.
Although there are important variations in the promulgation of the
necessity defense among various jurisdictions-indeed, only nineteen U.S.
states formally recognize the necessity justification, 151 it is nonetheless
possible to sum up its components as follows: (1) the defendant was faced
with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) the defendant acted to
prevent imminent harm; (3) the defendant reasonably anticipated a causal
connection between his actions and preventing the harm; (4) there were no
legal alternatives by which to avoid the harm; 152 (5) a legislative purpose to
exclude the justification does not plainly appear; and (6) the situation that
147. 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 53 (1984); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.02 (1985).
148. See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 16, at 141-42; Johnstone, supra note 8, at 349.
149. For England, see C.M.V. CLARKSON, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 122 (4th ed. 2005).
Note, however, that there may be a very narrow exception for medical necessity. For France, see CODE
PENAL [C. PtN.] art. 122-7; and CATHERINE ELLIOT, FRENCH CRIMINAL LAW 114 (2001). For Israel, see
PENAL LAW § 34k.
150. For Canada, see Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, 259. For Germany, see
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] §§ 34, 35. In Israel, necessity is a justification; on the implications
of necessity as a justification or excuse in the case of torture, see Mordechai Kremnitzer & Re'em
Segev, The Legality of Interrogational Torture: A Question of Proper Authorization or a Substantive
Moral Issue?, 34 ISR. L. REv. 509 (2000).
151. Michael H. Hofiheimer, Codifying Necessity: Legislative Resistance to Enacting Choice-
of-Evils Defenses to Criminal Liability, 82 TUL. L. REv. 191, 244-46 (2007).
152. Requirements 2 through 4 are not explicit in the Model Penal Code but are part of the
jurisprudence on necessity. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-13 (1993).
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necessitated the choice of evils was not caused by the defendant's own
negligence or recklessness.'
1 53
In some articulations of necessity, the harm prevented has to be
"significant," and the means used to prevent it not disproportionate in relation
to it.
154
The necessity justification is thus an act-utilitarian framework, 155 applied
within the conditions stipulated by law. Its contours would exclude a
premeditated violation of the law in the name of a greater good, where the
danger is not imminent and where there were obvious (and mandated) legal
alternatives that could be pursued. This latter type of behavior is more
commonly thought of as vigilantism.
Moreover, although some jurisdictions recognize the validity in principle
of a plea of necessity even in cases of intentional homicide, rarely is this plea
successful in practice. Ever since the landmark U.K. case of Regina v. Dudley
& Stephens,156 courts and juries have been hesitant to believe that the claim of
necessity is an honest one, that the defendant truly had no alternative, and that
the killing of an innocent human being was, in fact, "necessary." Usually, the
only justification accepted for intentional homicide is in the context of self-
defense, where the culpability of the victim, rather than his or her innocence,
is a key consideration.
Although Robinson states that this hesitation is consistent with Kantian
notions that value innocent human life as an absolute that cannot be sacrificed,
even for the purpose of saving a greater number of lives, 15 the commentary to
the Model Penal Code appears to permit the net saving of lives. 158 Robinson
himself acknowledges that a greater number of potential victims would make
a stronger case for killing an innocent individual, 159 ultimately leaving it to
different societies to make the value judgment about the weighing of innocent
lives. The reluctance of states to accept the necessity plea in cases of
homicide, even when resulting in the net saving of lives-the ultimate lesser
153. The Model Penal Code is narrower in its scope:
(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or
another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such
conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged; and (b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions
or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and (c) a legislative purpose to
exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. (2) When the actor
was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or
evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this
Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or
negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985).
154. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.320 note (2008) (citing these requirements as part of the
"three essential elements to the defense of necessity").
155. See Shaun P. Martin, The Radical Necessity Defense, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1527, 1532 (2005)
(arguing that the necessity defense is grounded upon the act-utilitarian view that certain post hoc
exceptions to general rules best advance social welfare).
156. (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng.). The case addressed the criminal culpability of two sailors
stranded on a lifeboat with another sailor and a young cabin boy; after several days at sea, they decided
to kill and feed on the flesh of the cabin boy. They were charged with murder and pleaded necessity. Id.
157. ROBtNSON, supra note 147, at 65.
158. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 1 (1985).
159. ROBINSON, supra note 147, at 68.
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evil-must therefore derive not from any strict moral aversion but from
broader societal considerations.
These societal considerations are fairly straightforward in the domestic
criminal law context: laws are made to guide the behavior of those subject to
them. Any exemption from their reach, such as a necessity plea (or duress or
self-defense), must be read narrowly. We are suspicious of disingenuous
claims, especially as most pleas of necessity are attempted where the actor
violates the law in order to promote her own interests, not those of others. And
even if we judge these claims to be genuine, we do not judge it best to create
systems in which people are trusted to make individual determinations about
which is the lesser or greater evil.
Domestic law reflects numerous compromises among competing
interests, claims, and values. We entrust the government, through its various
branches, to strike these compromises and make lesser-evil choices. In
determining to which issues it should allocate its time, attention, and
resources, the government often sacrifices some values or goods to promote
the guarantee of others. In fact, it is its business to make such choices. The
tendency to leave it to the government to make choice-of-evils determinations
is particularly strong in matters of life and death. We believe it is a basic tenet
of an orderly society that the government has a monopoly on force.' But we
expect the government to use this power to protect the social order, even
where we would strongly object to it if it were exercised by ordinary citizens.
And it is up to the government to send soldiers to fight, kill, and be killed in a
war that is thought of as necessary to protect the lives of other citizens.
To sum up, the reasons for which domestic law would allow for only a
narrow space for a plea of necessity can be grouped into the following: a
distinction between individuals and governments (by which we trust the latter
but not the former to make lesser-evil determinations), an interest in
preserving the state's monopoly over the use of power, and the rare incidence
of cases where people actually have to break the law in order to prevent a
greater harm, especially in the case of intentional homicide.
B. The Analogy to IHL
None of the three reasons for limiting the necessity defense in criminal
law applies to the context of armed conflict. First, in the domestic system
there is a clear dividing line between the powers of governments and the
powers of individuals, but this line is blurred in the world of war. Combatants
act not as individuals, but as agents of a government (or another entity). For
this reason, we are allowed to intentionally kill soldiers on the battlefield; we
kill them not as individuals but as agents of their own government (or by
reason of some other political association).
160. Posner, supra note 8, at 502; see also Jessica Conaway, Reversion Back to a State of
Nature in the United States Southern Borderlands: A Look at Potential Causes of Action To Curb
Vigilante Activity on the United States/Mexico Border, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1419, 1428 (2005)
(examining the dangers, both to illegal immigrants and to American values, of border vigilantism in the
Southwestern United States).
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When lesser-evil choices are concerned, the government sends its
soldiers to violate IHL in its name, for the purpose of a greater good. If
soldiers make this type of determination out of their volition, the government
can then either approve (explicitly or implicitly) the action after the fact or
prosecute the soldiers for breaking the law. If the government either orders the
soldier to act or approves of the act post factum, which are the two cases I am
interested in here, the action of the soldier is an action of a government agent,
not an individual. As the distinction between state action and individual action
dissolves, so does the difference in our attitudes toward the "dirtying of
hands"--the choosing between evils-by governments as opposed to
individuals.
Second, we believe it is a fundamental tenet of an orderly society that
the government has a monopoly over the use of force and we therefore allow
private citizens to use deadly force only under extremely limited
circumstances. But we employ soldiers for exactly the purpose of using deadly
force against other individuals. When soldiers do use deadly force against
other individuals, this is not considered a threat to the social order, but part of
the social order. The government's monopoly over power is allocated to the
individuals who operate on its behalf and who use deadly force as a matter of
course. This is another facet of the blurred lines between government action
and individual action in the context of war.
From this perspective, perhaps a better analogy to the humanitarian
necessity defense would not be the domestic necessity defense but the
regulation of police powers in domestic criminal law-the conditions under
which the police, as government agents, are allowed to use deadly force or
engage in search and seizure operations.' 6 Still, to emphasize its exceptional
nature, the general ex post necessity justification makes for a better
comparison for the humanitarian necessity justification than the ex ante
regulation of standard police powers.
Third, in the domestic setting we do not expect people to encounter
many cases in which they would have to choose between evils, let alone cause
the death of an innocent person in the process. A true situation of necessity is
extraordinary. It therefore makes sense to be instinctively suspicious of claims
about necessity, the more so when the claim involves the killing of an
innocent person. But war itself is all about choosing between evils. Acts that
are outrageous and abhorrent in daily life are commonplace in war. Choices of
who to kill or how to destroy are routine, unlike the extraordinary rescue
operation or the trolley gone astray which make the more common
hypothetical subjects for philosophical conundrums about lesser evils. No
wars are fought without causing the deaths of innocent people. Wars are a
series of determinations about who is going to live and who is going to die,
and certain actions are carried out-lawfully-with the prior knowledge that
innocent people are about to die.
It is for this reason that IHL makes the distinction between intentionally
targeting the innocent, which is unlawful, and harming civilians as the
161. This analogy is employed by Posner and Vermeule in their discussion of the ex ante
regulation of torture. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 103, at 699-704.
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reasonable collateral consequences of an otherwise legitimate targeting of
combatants, which is lawful. This is in essence the proportionality principle,
which underlies much of the laws of war.' 62 Thus, while domestic law draws
the line between choosing a lesser evil that does not involve the killing of
another human being (which may be excused) and choosing a lesser evil that
would involve the killing of another human being (which is almost never
excused), the laws of war draw the line between the intentional killing of a
civilian (which is absolutely forbidden) and the unintentional, even if
foreseen, killing of a civilian (which is allowed).
Finally, and most importantly, we must look at the different rationales of
these two systems of law, domestic law and IHL: while domestic law reflects
a compromise among competing ideologies, interests, preferences and
resources, IHL very clearly states its own goal as maximizing humanitarian
protections from harms of inevitable wars. In other words, IHL, as it stands, is
the epitome of the principle of lesser evil: the taming of warfare at the price of
granting a legal imprimatur for all actions not strictly forbidden.
For all these reasons, too, an attempt to imagine any particular state as a
single citizen in an international country of states and transpose the domestic
necessity defense onto the international one is bound to fail. Even if we were
to treat the state's action as an action taken by an individual, thereby
reinstating the individual-government dichotomy, we would be left with the
absence of a corresponding "government" to the individual-state. There is no
international entity with a monopoly over state power, no international entity
whose business it is to make lesser-evil choices for states, and states still face
the need to make such choices, especially at wartime, much more frequently
than individuals do in any domestic system.
Thus, the necessity defense has been narrowed in the domestic sphere
for reasons that do not apply to the international arena. In designing a
humanitarian necessity justification, we might well imagine a less
constraining, more strictly utilitarian paradigm.
On the other hand, fully imagining states as citizens in an international
country highlights other substantial differences between the social daily-life
interaction among citizens and the conduct of states at war, differences that
warrant narrowing the domestic necessity defense rather than broadening it,
when we contemplate the operation of a humanitarian justification. First,
while in the domestic system we expect impartial law enforcement agencies
and courts to administer the laws and to be arbiters of competing claims, no
such system exists in the international sphere. The enforcement of IHL rules is
still, to a large degree, a self-regulated process. There is no central
adjudicatory or enforcement mechanism to which all nations and combatants
are subject and consequently no reliable check against abuses or misuses of
the exemption from liability.
Second, and more important, the domestic necessity defense is neutral
with regard to whether the significant harm averted was one facing the
162. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(5) ("Among others, the following types of
attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: . . . (b) An attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.").
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defendant or facing others. Textbook hypotheticals offer examples of both
cases, although real-life cases tend to be more of the former than the latter. It
is difficult to estimate the real incidence of each type of case, given
prosecutorial discretion or plea bargains that dispense with both types of
cases, leaving only the difficult or dubious ones to stand trial. Conceptually,
however, as long as the net benefit to society is greater, the lesser-harm
requirement is satisfied.
This neutrality about the recipient of the benefit is understood if we
assume that all citizens are similarly situated with regard to one another. Even
if we assume that individuals have a greater interest in preventing harm to
themselves than to others, the legal system assumes that they generally do not
have an interest in intentionally harming others, especially where there are no
preexisting relationships that would create such a bias. Where courts have
believed that a decision of whom to sacrifice and whom to save was tainted by
less-than-objective considerations, they have been reluctant to uphold the
necessity defense.' 
63
But for states at war we can make no such assumptions. In war, a state
not only prefers its own interests to those of its enemy but also has an interest
in deliberately harming its enemy. Harming the enemy is another way of
promoting one's own self-interest. The most obvious demonstration of this
interest is the lawful intentional killing of enemy combatants. Whether states
also have an inherent interest in harming enemy civilians is a question that
exceeds the boundaries of this work, but history tells us that, at the very least,
states care far less about the well-being of civilians belonging to the enemy
(or any other) state than about their own.
IHL rules are primarily intended for the safeguarding of the interests of a
state's sworn enemies; rightly or wrongly, the construct of war makes the
well-being of the state and the well-being of its enemies appear diametrically
opposed. As IHL moved from a reciprocity-based exchange to unconditional
obligations, its effort to accord civilians (and, to some extent, combatants)
certain protections from the scourge of war may be viewed as an effort to
correct against the biases that states at war have with regard to their enemies.
To be true to the goals of IHL, a humanitarian necessity justification
must therefore be designed in a way that would consider these biases and the
efforts of IHL to tame them. If so, the contours of the domestic necessity
defense, which assumes no interest in harming others, would seem broader
than what we should allow within the world of armed conflict.
To sum up, domestic criminal law and the laws of war operate in very
different contexts in terms of their immediate addressees (individuals versus
states), the type of violence they regulate (exceptional violence versus routine
violence), and the type of interests they must take into account (a complex
web of interests versus balancing military necessity and humanitarian
considerations). All of these would suggest that the domestic necessity
defense is unduly narrow when applied to the IHL field. But the two bodies of
163. See United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 366-67 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383),
where, in a case involving the throwing of fourteen individuals overboard to save a sinking lifeboat, the
court instructed the jury that necessity was no defense to murder because the fourteen victims were not
selected by lot.
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law are also different in their institutional environment (domestic law
enforcement versus anarchy) and in the type of social interaction which sets
the stage for choice-of-evils situations (citizens within the state versus enemy
states). This suggests, in contrast, that the necessity defense is overly
permissive as applied to the IHL world.
It follows that the domestic necessity paradigm is a useful subject for
comparison but not for direct transposition onto the international level, and
that relevant differences between the two bodies of law must be taken into
account in adapting the domestic defense to operate as a humanitarian
necessity justification in IHL. 164
V. CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EXCLUSION OF A
CHOICE-OF-EVILS JUSTIFICATION IN IHL
In this Part, I outline and evaluate various possible explanations for the
rejection of a lesser-evil justification by IHL. My line of investigation centers,
at first, on deontological reasoning, 165 then moves on to consider a host of
consequentialist arguments, 166 including uncertainty, slippery slope
arguments, and spill-over effects. In both cases, I largely ignore the many
shades and variations that each of these moral theories assumes, and instead
discuss their most basic, widely accepted tenets. Finally, I address, as a subset
of a consequentialist framework, the institutional features of IHL, including its
lawmaking process, adjudication and enforcement, and the effects of these
features on the possible recognition of a humanitarian necessity justification.
Some of these conventional explanations have been advanced explicitly
in the literature, while others are imagined on the basis of accounts offered in
other contexts. The purpose of this Section is not to duplicate existing
scholarship on the relative strengths and weaknesses of different moral
perspectives. Instead, I limit the discussion to the operation of these various
perspectives in relation to the humanitarian justification paradigm I suggest
here. My aim is to explore whether these various explanations could account
for the rejection of the paradigm of humanitarian necessity in IHL, while
accepting the necessity defense in domestic criminal law. This inquiry is less
pertinent to deontological reasoning, which poses a similar challenge to the
recognition of a necessity justification in domestic criminal law, and more to
164. On the exercise of borrowing from the principles of domestic criminal law in devising
international criminal law, the U.N. Special Rapporteur stated that "transferring [such principles] from
the field of relations between individuals to that of relations between States is a dubious undertaking."
Special Rapporteur, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7 (Feb. 29, June 10, June 19, 1980) (prepared by Robert Ago), reprinted in [1980] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l.
165. Deontologists hold that the rightness of a choice is determined by its conformity with a
moral norm. Accordingly, from a deontological perspective, certain choices are inherently evil and can
never be justified, even if they would bring about a good outcome. See, e.g., STEPHEN DARWALL,
DEONTOLOGY (2003).
166. Consequentialists maintain that choices are not morally "good" or "bad" in themselves,
but should instead be assessed solely by virtue of the outcomes they bring about, that is, by their
consequences. See, e.g., STEPHEN DARWALL, CONSEQUENTIALISM (2003). The paradigmatic strand of
consequentialism is utilitarianism, which generally holds that the morally right action is the one that
produces the most good. I use the terms "consequentialist" and "utilitarian" interchangeably in this
piece.
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the consequentialist and institutional explanations. In the context of the latter
two, I ask whether there are features unique to the world of war that make any
necessity exemption wholly incongruous, even though we accept its operation
in the domestic world.
A. Deontological Justifications
From a deontological stance, the actions proscribed by strict IHL rules-
torture, the conscription of enemy civilians to one's own armed forces, the
direct targeting of civilians, rape as an act of war, depriving the civilian
population of supplies essential to its survival, the taking of hostages, and
many others-are inherently repugnant, a violation of a moral imperative in
the Kantian sense, independent of any cost-benefit calculation in any
particular instance. A pure deontological paradigm, which deems certain evils
absolutely and forever prohibited, must therefore accord greater credence to
the specific prohibitions than to the overall effort of IHL as a body of law.
This is particularly so because the underlying ideology of IHL is banning
certain cruelties even if it means prolonging the less cruel war.
Pure deontologists would find little appeal in the recognition of a
humanitarian necessity justification let alone consider the possibility that such
recognition would help promote humanitarian welfare in particular
circumstances. Conceding this point, I nonetheless find it useful to question
the strengths of deontological reasoning as applied to the world of IHL,
especially because the absolutism of IHL is often identified as originating in
deontological motivations. But deontology and IHL are hard to square: first,
because war makes an uneasy fit for deontology; second, because it cannot
account for all IHL rules; third, because the degree to which deontology could
ever be assigned as a moral paradigm to governments, as opposed to
individuals, is under much debate; and fourth, because all but the very pure
deontologists recognize that in extreme cases of weighing harms, absolute
principles must make way for some consequentialist calculations.
Deontologists face their greatest challenge in war. War is about
committing evils and choosing between evils. No war can be fought without
causing death, long-term injury, suffering, degradation, and despair. Any war
is a violation of numerous human rights, including the right to life, self-
dignity, health, access to food and water, education, and more. The individual
experience of war may be no less grave and traumatic than any known form of
torture. A true commitment to moral imperatives is hard to reconcile with war.
But if deontologists are willing to endorse any practical system of laws of war
other than pacifism, they must resign to some degree of evil, even if they
would be loath to accept it in any other setting.'
67
167. A commitment to deontological ethics may require the collapse of the distinction between
jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the sense that to justify any evil committed during the war, it would
have to be shown that the prosecution of the war was just to begin with. On the degree to which this
distinction should be upheld, compare WALZER, supra note 12, arguing to uphold it, with Jeff
McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHics 693 (2004), arguing that the distinction was
unsustainable.
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Under the current laws of war, some moral absolutes are already
compromised: the absolute ban on the intentional targeting of civilians
1 68
gives way to the principle of double effect which does not preclude the
foreseen-yet-unintended proportional killing of civilians.' 69 Paradoxically, it is
the military attack on the enemy that is considered the inherently good action
which the collateral killing of civilians serves.
A corollary moral principle to that of the double effect is never to use
people as instruments. 170 Accordingly, many philosophers believe that the
saving of lives could neverjustify the taking of lives, even if the lives saved
outnumber the lives taken. 171 Some argue that even in clear situations of self-
defense, the intentional killing of civilians would be morally wrong.172 But the
deontological objection against using people as means rather than ends seems,
perhaps counter-intuitively, particularly weak in the context of war, where
soldiers are used precisely as that: means for winning the war, defending the
country, etc. As Napoleon callously remarked, "soldiers are made to be
killed." 171 If the laws of war already make the concession that killing
individuals who are soldiers is a means rather than an end, the deontological
prohibition when it comes to civilians seems much weaker than at first glance.
Even more broadly than its relevance to war, scholars question the
applicability of deontological reasoning to state action in general. Deontology
is premised on the notion of individuals as rational actors. But the degree to
which a state can be personified is questionable, and so is the degree to which
we can or should assign to a state moral prescriptions.1 74 If this is so, one
could hold that even though deontology is a sound moral theory for
168. Michael Walzer explains the moral absolutist view against targeting civilians in the
following manner: "Morality is not negotiable. Innocence is inviolable .... To protect the innocent or,
at least, to exclude them from deliberate attack, is to act justly. And we must act justly whatever the
consequences: fiat justitia, ruat caelum (do justice even if the heavens fall)." MICHAEL WALZER,
ARGUING ABOUT WAR 36 (2004).
169. See Additional Protocol 1, supra note 1, art. 51(5). The Catholic principle of double effect
posits, in short, that an inherently good act which inescapably entails negative consequences is morally
justified as long as the actor does not intend the negative effects (though he may foresee them) and the
good effects outweigh the bad. See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understanding the Principle of Double
Effect, 90 ETHICS 527, 528 (1980).
170. Thomas Nagel has explained this principle as prescribing that the "hostile treatment of any
person must be justified in terms of something about that person which makes the treatment
appropriate." Nagel, supra note 12, at 133. A related principle is that of the separateness of persons,
according to which actions that violate fundamental rights of any particular person ought not to be
permissible on account of the aggregation of the interests of others. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Equality, in
MORTAL QUESTIONS 106, 115 (1979); John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 293 (1977).
171. See, e.g., Taurek, supra note 170 (objecting to the idea that in rescue cases, when one
chooses to let one die in order to save several others, one is choosing the lesser evil). But cf David
Cummiskey, Kant's Consequentialism, 100 ETHICS 586 (1990) (arguing that Kantian moral theory does
not preclude the sacrifice of the innocent).
172. "Soldiers who kill intentionally civilians in war can usually invoke only the excuse of self-
preservation, and claim that they killed civilians to save their own lives from a threat that did not
emanate from the civilians. Such self-preservative killing of an innocent non-attacker fails to treat the
person justly." COLM McKEOGH, INNOCENT CIVILIANS: THE MORALITY OF KILLING IN WAR 156-57
(2002).
173. WALZER, supra note 12, at 136.
174. Russel Hardin, International Deontology, 9 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 133, 135-36 (1995)
(arguing that states are not rationalist actors and thus cannot be subject to Kantian theory).
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individuals, government morality should be nonetheless outcome-based. 175
This is the position taken by Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, who
identify the longstanding distinctions between acts and omissions and
(indirectly) between intended and foreseen consequences as serving to strike a
moral balance between personal autonomy and impersonal obligations to the
collective good.176 This purpose, they argue, is irrelevant for the government,
which should be concerned only with the collective good.
Beyond the difficulties in reconciling some broad principles of IHL with
deontological reasoning, specific IHL rules are also difficult to account for
under a deontological paradigm. Consider, for example, the earlier mentioned
prohibition on perfidy, which forbids acts such as feigning the status of a
civilian as a ruse of war. 177 Is trying to conceal oneself in combat by
pretending to be a civilian inherently evil or dehumanizing? There is no
prohibition on soldiers wearing civilian clothes per se-only on the feigning
of civilian status during combat as a way of gaining military advantage.
Although the official commentary to the Geneva Conventions notes that the
central element of perfidy is "the deliberate claim to legal protection for
hostile purposes," historically, the origins of the prohibition on perfidy are
rooted in medieval ideals of chivalry and honor on the battlefield-ideals
concerning warriors' dignity more than any universal moral imperatives.
7
8
These are in fact the opposite of today's ideals of equality and universalism.
The modem rationale for the prohibition has changed to suit the desire to
safeguard the combatant-civilian distinction and thus enhance protection for
civilians, a principle that resonates of consequentialist calculations more than
deontological reasoning. 179 The same is true for the present-day prohibition on
treacherously attacking the enemy while using the U.N. flag or insignia or
feigning surrender. 180 Unlike the Kantian imperative, dishonesty on the
battlefield, including by ruses of war, is not unlawful per se; any attempt to
175. Nagel, supra note 170, at 83-84.
176. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Ethics and Empirics of Capital Punishment: Is
Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703,
719-24 (2005). A broad philosophical literature questions whether the concept of "intention" can be
accurately assigned to governments as it is to individuals. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY:
ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE (2000) (questioning the applicability of the idea of culpability
for intentional wrongdoing when it comes to governments); see also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT 10 (1999) (commenting that legislation is a result of a process that brings together "a
large bunch of people who do not share a view about anything ...."); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn
Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723 (1982) (describing the difficulties of determining
intent and the inability to divorce intent from authorship).
177. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 37(l)(c).
178. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 435
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). Accordingly, the ICRC Commentary also observes that a "sense of
honour, which was nourished during the Middle Ages of Europe by chivalry... has contributed to the
establishment of the rules which finally became assimilated into the customs and practices of war....
Perfidy was considered a dishonour ....I d. at 434.
179. The commentary notes, "[t]o reject [this rule] would have meant compromising the
fundamental distinction between civilians and combatants, which forms the basis for the law of armed
conflict." Id. at 438.
180. Id. at 439.
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justify the perfidy prohibition on deontological grounds would therefore
require defining the "immoral act" very narrowly indeed. 181
The prohibition on treacherously assassinating rogue leaders 82 or
putting a price on their heads 183 is similarly difficult to justify on any
deontological grounds. Since the act of killing per se is not a violation of a
moral imperative under the laws of war, what is it about going after a leader-
who is by definition more responsible for evil than any soldier on the
battlefield-that is morally repugnant? 184 As a historical matter, the
prohibition was devised by kings and sovereigns out of a mutual desire to
protect themselves during wars of aggression embarked on as a matter of
course, rather than as part of the Catholic moral tenets of Just War.
185
Even the banning of certain types of weapons186 raises debates on
whether it reflects a real moral aversion to especially heinous weapons, a
concern about the lack of effective distinction between combatants and
civilians, or a much more cynical political calculation of comparative and
absolute advantage on the battlefield. One way of testing the strength of
deontological objections to unconventional weapons is to imagine the case of
nonlethal biological or chemical weapons, which are absolutely prohibited
under international law-would we still feel the same kind of aversion to
using a poisonous gas if the gas would only put combatants to sleep? If the
answer is no, the absolute prohibition on the use of poisonous gas cannot be
purely deontological.
Moreover, many IHL provisions include explicit exceptions for military
necessity, thereby significantly constricting the prohibition in ways that could
not be accounted for under moral absolutism: the obligation of combatants to
distinguish themselves from civilians is eliminated where combatants cannot
do so "owing to the nature of hostilities."1 87 If it is a moral imperative to
maintain the distinction at all times, on what basis are concessions made for
situations in which distinguishing oneself as a combatant would be too
dangerous? Advance warning must be given before launching attacks which
181. Id. at 439-44.
182. The extent of the prohibition is under debate. See Michael Rubin, An Arrow in Our
Quiver: Why the U.S. Government Should Consider Assassination, NAT'L REV., Aug. 28, 2006, at 33, 34
("Even during open hostilities, U.S. military doctrine prohibits targeting an opposing political leader
unless, according to the U.S. Army's 1996 Operational Law Handbook, his death is 'indispensable for
securing the complete submission of the enemy."').
183. See JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T,
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 17 (Maj. Joseph B. Berger III, Maj. Derek 1. Grimes, & Maj. Eric T.
Jensen eds., 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/law2004.pdf ("Hiring assassins,
putting a price on the enemy's head, and offering rewards for an enemy 'dead or alive' is prohibited.").
184. See Catherine Lotrionte, When To Target Leaders, WASH. Q., Summer 2003, at 73, 75
(arguing that the ban on assassination encourages a policy of military strikes, which claims innocent
lives); Turner, supra note 3 (arguing that the proportionality principle supports the idea that it is wrong
to allow the killing often thousand relatively innocent soldiers and civilians if the underlying aggression
can be brought to an end by the elimination of one guilty individual).
185. See Ward Thomas, Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination, INT'L
SECURITY, Summer 2000, at 105, 116.
186. Specific bans on particular types of weapons are part of the distinct legal field of arms
control; nonetheless, general provisions on weapons which cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering are part of IHL. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 35.
187. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3).
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Not only does the protection of civilians fade in the face of military needs, but
this provision also seems to significantly narrow the distance between
intentional and foreseen harm.
Finally, there are important debates among deontologists themselves
about the extent to which Kant's writings actually proscribe the sacrificing of
the innocent for a greater good. 189 Moreover, an important school of
deontology, known as "threshold deontology," acknowledges that at some
extreme points, one cannot avoid some consequentialist analysis that would
require a departure from the absolute prescription. Threshold deontology
responds to the accusation that pure deontology would allow catastrophic
outcomes for the sake of moral narcissism. For this school, the debate is no
longer about the permissibility of lesser-evil calculations, only about the terms
and conditions for its application: for Walzer, a departure from absolutes is
permissible only where a country is facing the danger of annihilation.
1 90
Others accept some degree of a cost-benefit calculation even in less extreme
scenarios. Tom Stacy, for instance, argues that Kantian moral philosophy
actually supports necessity killing. He claims that where it is inevitable that an
innocent will die, killing the innocent where this killing results in a net
savings of lives "is more faithful to the respect for the rational life of each
individual person."' 91 War, we must remember, inevitably entails choosing
which people to kill.
Threshold deontology has been especially debated in the context of
torture. Against Jeremy Waldron's absolute rejection of torture, 92 under any
and all conditions, a majority of writers seem to agree that under some
extreme conditions ("extreme" being a subjective determination), torture
could be excused, justified, and even necessary. 193 In fact, most commentators
on torture concede that it would be impossible to discuss its immorality in a
decontextualized manner, not only on practical grounds but on moral grounds,
too, without taking account of lives it might save. This does not mean that the
prohibition on torture is not driven by deontological considerations, but only
that in practice, consequentialist calculations complement the deontological
analysis when the prohibition is tested in particular cases.
To sum up, a humanitarian necessity justification is impossible to square
with a commitment to deontology, and true deontologists would likely find
such an exemption objectionable and dangerous. Yet the extent to which
deontology is an appropriate moral paradigm for government action is
debatable, much more so, perhaps, in the world of war, where much killing
and injury is inflicted intentionally and commonly and where members of an
entire class of people-soldiers-are stripped of most of their fundamental
188. Id. art. 57(2)(c) (emphasis added).
189. See Cummiskey, supra note 171, at 586.
190. In his terms, "supreme emergency." WALZER, supra note 12, at 251; see also CHARLES
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 10 (1978) (arguing that "extreme cases" may justify deviations from absolute
norms).
191. Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L.
481, 511 (2002).
192. Waldron, supra note 97.
193. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
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rights to begin with. In comparison with domestic criminal law, to the extent
deontologists are willing to accept a necessity defense there, the
distinguishing characteristics of armed conflicts-where situations requiring
killing are more likely to emerge-would suggest they should be more willing
to recognize it in the context of IHL, not less.
In addition, deontology cannot account for all IHL rules, nor can it
account for the compromises in which absolute prohibitions yield to military
necessity. Deontology itself does not offer us a sound way of distinguishing
the absolute rules from the qualified ones. And finally, a significant portion of
deontologists are threshold deontologists, who accept some element of
consequentialist cost-benefit calculation in extreme cases. Once susceptible to
such qualifications, it is no longer inevitable for threshold-deontological
morality to exclude all forms of a humanitarian necessity justification.
B. Consequentialist Justifications
A pure consequentialist framework judges actions exclusively on the
basis of their outcomes in terms of the "good" they promote.1 94 Naturally,
defining what "good" outcomes are requires some preceding normative
determination, especially one that would define the "good" independently
from specific prohibitions or prescriptions. This is true in any consequentialist
analysis, whether we apply it to the necessity defense in domestic criminal
law or to the humanitarian necessity paradigm in IHL. Domestic law reflects a
compromise among competing ideologies, interests, preferences and
resources. In contrast, IHL seems to lend itself more easily to a utilitarian,
teleological analysis on the basis of its normative grundnorm: the
maximization of humanitarian protections from harms of inevitable wars-the
quintessential lesser evil.
If we accept the domestic necessity defense under a consequentialist
framework, why should we then reject it in IHL? In the following analysis, I
suggest three possible considerations for the rejection of a cost-benefit
analysis, or at least for suspicion of it, and ask whether these considerations
are more pertinent in the world of armed conflict than in domestic
interactions. These considerations are uncertainty, a concern about slippery
slopes, and spillover effects.
A few clarifications are in order. First, the analysis generally ignores the
problem of incommensurability of values,' 95 assuming, instead, that we can
determine what a lesser evil is in much the same way we determine it in
domestic law. It is nonetheless limited to harms and benefits which IHL seeks
194. But see WALZER, supra note 168, at 38 ("Utilitarianism, which was supposed to be the
most precise and hard-headed of moral arguments, turns out to be the most speculative and arbitrary. For
we have to assign values where there is no agreed valuation, no recognized hierarchy of value, no
market mechanism for determining the positive or negative worth of different acts and outcomes.").
195. On incommensurable evils and deontological evils, see generally Larry Alexander, Lesser
Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic Justification, 26 L. & PHIL. 611 (2005). Note that Kenneth
Simons argues that the incommensurability problem should not trouble us too much, as we regularly
engage in a similar type of balancing of harms in the determination of reckless or negligent behavior
when these are part of the definition of the crime. See Kenneth W. Simons, Exploring the Intricacies of
the Lesser Evils Defense, 26 L. & PHIL. 645, 650 (2005).
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to minimize and maximize, correspondingly, rather than any self-interest of
the party violating the rule. Still, the caveat remains that where consequences
cannot be weighed along a definite and agreed measurement, a utilitarian
analysis should be rejected.
In addition, I follow the distinction between act-consequentialism and
rule-consequentialism. The former assesses the outcomes of every particular
act; the necessity defense in criminal law is believed to be act-
consequentialist. The latter weighs the effects of having a particular rule in
place (and therefore the average outcome of acts that follow the rule). In our
context, it is the difference between weighing the particular effects of any
lesser-evil act and weighing the overall impact of introducing a rule that
would recognize a lesser-evil justification. This current analysis focuses on
the latter.
At first glance, a pure consequentialist analysis would justify, by
definition, a lesser-evil act, as defined here. This might even be true in the
case of the torture or the killing of one innocent person intended to save two
others. But as we move toward a rule-consequentialist paradigm, the average
assessment of any instance that depends on the recognition of a humanitarian
necessity justification requires the inclusion of indirect costs and benefits in
addition to those of the immediate outcome. As the benefits of a humanitarian
necessity justification are relatively clear, I focus here on the risks of
recognizing the justification as a rule.
1. Uncertainty
A humanitarian necessity justification, like the domestic necessity
justification, operates in two time-zones: the ex ante determination that
following the law would cause greater humanitarian harm than deviating from
it, and the ex post examination of concrete outcomes (which are then
compared with counterfactual outcomes).
The great difficulty in the ex ante assessment in the IHL context lies in
the fact that any operation on the battlefield is necessarily mired in
uncertainty, or what Clausewitz termed "the fog" of war.1 96 Anything from a
change in weather conditions, faulty munitions, an unforeseen change on the
ground, the collapse of lines of communication, to simple human errors could
lead to an outcome very different from the one intended. The IDF soldiers
who rely on a local resident to call on a suspect to surrender can never be
certain that the resident will remain unharmed, or that the suspect will in fact
surrender, or whether they would end up needing, instead, to employ more
force and endanger more people by executing the arrest themselves. Torturing
a terrorist may or may not be effective-he or she may or may not provide
information. Once obtained, information may be useful, even sufficient to
avert the danger, or altogether irrelevant. The direct attack on civilians may
induce a change in the government's behavior-in Japan's case, induce the
196. VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 39, at 140 ("[T]he general unreliability of all information
presents a special problem in war: all action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which, like
fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.").
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Emperor to surrender-but it is also possible, as in the case of the Blitzkrieg
on London, that it would backfire and cause the population and the leadership
to dig in their heels and form a stronger, more entrenched national unity.
Given the uncertainty factor, the determination of lesser evil is bound to be
speculative and often inaccurate.
IHL rules, it may well be argued, have been devised with the problem of
uncertainty in mind. Like any other rules, they were installed precisely in
order to eliminate the need to assess consequences in any particular case. In
alternating between specific rules, such as an absolute prohibition on the
intentional targeting of civilians, and standards, such as the prohibition on the
destruction of civilian property where not absolutely necessary, IHL was
designed to produce the best humanitarian outcome on average.
But whether IHL produces the best humanitarian outcome is
questionable. The hundreds of instances in which the Early Warning
Procedure was implemented resulted in only one civilian casualty. Although it
is impossible to assert how many Palestinians have been spared as a direct
consequence of the procedure, the 2007 casualty reports-nineteen people
who were not the intended target of arrest-suggest that in this case,
uncertainty should not have warranted absolutism.
The domestic world is not immune to uncertainty either. Dudley and
Stephens could have been picked up by a boat a minute before they chose to
eat the young cabin boy, or left afloat to die, or as it turned out, saved on the
following day. Their ability to foresee possible outcomes was not better-and
probably worse-than many decisions taken on the battlefield.
Even conceding that uncertainty is probably greater in war, and that
adversarial interaction on the battlefield makes the unknown more common,
often more harmful and more dominant, it is unclear why transferring the risk
of uncertainty onto the actor would not offer a sufficient response to this
concern; as uncertainty grows, so does the risk assumed by the attacker.
Shifting the costs of uncertainty onto the potential attacker would encourage
the attacker to be more careful in pursuing only those cases in which the
humanitarian tradeoff is more certain.
Moreover, it is possible that introducing uncertainty as a risk to be
weighed rather than act as an absolute bar might even encourage attackers to
assess the consequences of their operations more carefully than if the
justification is barred altogether. IHL orders combatants to take all feasible
precautions to minimize incidental loss of civilian life and refrain from
disproportionate attacks that may cause excessive incidental loss to
civilians.1 97 Even if the attacker follows the law, both these provisions leave
ample room to shift the costs of uncertainty onto enemy civilians. If, however,
the attacker were ready to assume the risk of operating under the humanitarian
necessity justification, he would have to absorb the cost of uncertainty without
the ability to shift it onto the target. To demonstrate this last point, consider
again the case of arrests in the West Bank. If the humanitarian necessity
justification is recognized, the IDF has an incentive to design and execute the
Procedure in a way that would mitigate the risks to civilians much more than
197. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, arts. 51(1), 57.
[Vol. 35: 1
The Laws of War and the "Lesser Evil"
under the general rules on precautions in attack. The IHL formula of the
"excessive incidental loss of life" is measured against the military advantage
to be gained from the attack, not against the lives of other Palestinians who
might be hurt or spared.
Naturally, the benefits of mitigating the problem of uncertainty by
placing a higher risk on the invoker of the justification would have to be
weighed against the chilling effects such higher risk is likely to have on those
who might contemplate breaking the law to increase humanitarian welfare. I
return to this discussion later in the Article.
2. The Slippery Slope Argument
In the context of a humanitarian necessity justification, the slippery
slope argument can be summarized as follows: even though the justification
may be appropriate in a particular case, allowing it as a rule might open the
floodgates to inappropriate actions (or, what Fred Schauer terms the
movement from the "instance case" to the "danger case"198). Left to their own
devices, actors will interpret every exception in the broadest possible manner,
quickly leading to abuse.
Although extensively debated in the literature, 199 the slippery slope
argument has often been voiced as a general rationale for absolute rather than
qualified rules: rules are narrower than standards and are easier to limit to the
right instance case with less concern that they would also cover the danger
case. This is especially true if we believe the incidence of justifiable instances
is low.
The slippery slope concern undoubtedly played a part in the Israeli HCJ
ruling against the Neighbor Procedure. Lurking in the background was
evidence of widespread use by IDF units in the Occupied Territories of
Palestinian civilians as human shields, which was a precursor to the petition
against the amended Procedure. Although the judges never addressed this
concern explicitly, their allusion to the difficulty in ascertaining "consent" or
in guaranteeing the civilians' safety resonate of the deeply troubling past
practices of the security forces on the field with regards to Palestinian
civilians.
Most commonly in our present context, the slippery slope concern has
been invoked to justify a blanket prohibition on torture under the argument
that any exception, including for a "ticking bomb" scenario, is going to result
in excessive torture. 200 More difficult to monitor than the Early Warning
Procedure or deliberate attacks on civilians (acts of torture are easier to hide
198. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1985); cf Mario J. Rizzo &
Douglas Glen Whitman, The Camel's Nose Is in the Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery Slopes, 51
UCLA L. REv. 539, 541 (2003) (claiming that slippery slopes are foremost slopes of arguments, not
acts).
199. David Enoch, Once You Start Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You're on a Very Slippery
Slope, 21 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 629 (2001); Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 198; Schauer, supra note
198; Eugene Volokh, Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1026 (2003).
200. See, e.g., David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425,
1445 (2005) (arguing that the authorization of torture establishes a culture of torture that then leads to
excessive and unjustifiable use of torture); Shue, supra note 101, at 139-42; Waldron, supra note 97, at
1714-15.
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under the radar than the dropping of bombs), any exception to the prohibition
on torture runs a greater risk of being malevolently exploited.
And still, despite its undoubtable force, the slippery slope argument
should not fully exclude a humanitarian justification paradigm. First, because
IHL is already comprised of both rules and standards, the latter particularly
inviting slippery slope concerns. Whether this mixture actually produces the
best outcome on average, or whether humanitarian welfare might, in fact,
increase if some rules should become standards or vice versa is an empirical
question. Moreover, the moment that killing civilians was made permissible to
some degree on the basis of the intended/foreseen distinction, the dangers of
the slippery slope have already entered into the system.
But more important, in order to accept the lack of a necessity
justification in IHL on the basis of the slippery slope concern, while allowing
necessity in domestic law, we would have to find the two systems of law
sufficiently different in relevant ways. In particular, we would have to be able
to make two kinds of determinations. First, we would need to determine that
the incidence of justifiable exceptions is lower in war than outside of it. Such
a determination is impossible to make, and in fact, I would argue the opposite.
War being what it is, the incidence of justifiable violations would seem
potentially much higher than in daily life. The death and destruction that are
dealt as a matter of course in war are what distinguishes killing in war from
the norms of domestic affairs, and are also what brings about the need to save
people. The prevalence of life-life tradeoffs-perhaps the most important
choice-of-evils scenario-is thus much greater in war than in the domestic
sphere.
Second, we would have to determine that the fundamental differences in
the motivations driving individuals to break the law as opposed to those
driving states at war make the dangers of exploitation greater in the latter
context. Individuals may have an inherent interest in promoting their own
welfare even at the expense of others. But harming others does not necessarily
promote one's own welfare. In war, inflicting harm on the enemy by
definition increases the benefit to the actor-state. Given this assumed mens
rea, I acknowledge that the risk of exploitation in the world of war may be
higher than in the domestic sphere, and that it is possible that states would try
to interpret or apply a necessity justification in ways that would tend to
promote their own welfare at the expense of their enemies. Nonetheless, and
without being able to prove my argument empirically at this time, I hold that
this danger may be mitigated by designing the justification in a way that
would substantially weaken this inherent bias of the state.
Most importantly, the choice to reject the justification because of the
slippery slope concern is not cost-free. A frequently voiced critique of the
concern is that it often deters us from making tough but necessary choices.
This critique seems particularly apt in the context of armed conflicts. If we
believe that in the right case, a humanitarian necessity justification could in
fact save lives and minimize suffering, then rejecting it altogether because of
the concern that it might be badly exploited in "danger cases" would be just as
immoral as exploiting it.
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3. Spillover Effects
Another challenge to the consequentialist framework is related to the
slippery slope concern but is different in focus. Whereas the former deals with
potential abuses in applying the practice or rule in "hard" or unsuitable cases,
the concern over spillover effects is directed at the potential effects of a
particular practice or rule beyond its immediate intended consequences.
This concern has often been voiced in the context of torture: beyond the
fear of excessive torture and the revulsion against the intentional physical
abuse of another human being, accepting torture as a legitimate tool for the
government to use whenever it deems fit is worrying to citizens at large.
Entrusting the government with the right to use torture might be understood or
misunderstood by the government as authorization for coercive and excessive
methods in other areas of security or law enforcement. It might also instill a
degree of fear and suspicion among citizens toward their government-a
government that is willing and capable of engaging in torture-more
generally. All in all, the introduction of torture as a legitimate means of
compelling an actor to do or abstain from doing something, coupled with the
slippery slope concern, is dangerous not only to potential victims of torture
but also to the trust in and trustworthiness of the torturing government.20
When former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro was kidnapped by the Red
Brigades in 1978, one of the kidnappers was captured by the police. The
kidnapper did not reveal where Moro was taken, and by the time the police
found Moro hidden in a car trunk, he was already dead. When asked why he
would not order the torturing of the kidnapper for information, General Carlo
Alberto Dalla Chiesa reportedly responded, "Italy can survive the loss of Aldo
Moro. It would not survive the introduction of torture."
20 2
But like the slippery slope or uncertainty concerns, the gravity of
spillover effects is an empirical estimate. To the extent they can be estimated,
spillover effects can be introduced into the lesser-evil calculus, just as they
may be introduced into any domestic necessity calculation. Their introduction,
rather than excluding the justification, simply raises the bar for upholding it in
any particular case. If anything, when comparing the two contexts, it would
seem that governments, whose business it is to make choice-of-evils decisions
domestically, are better at considering spillover effects than individuals are.
This is particularly true for cases in which the humanitarian violation is
decided upon at higher levels and not by individual soldiers on the ground.
Furthermore, alongside the risks of adverse effects, one could also think of
positive spillover effects of the humanitarian necessity paradigm, as when the
paradigm is used to amplify the normative message of humanitarian
considerations.
201. See, e.g., William Twining & Barrie Paskins, Torture and Philosophy, 52 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 143, 165-94 (Supp. 1978).
202. See DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 100, at 134 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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C. Institutional Considerations
20 3
Although I argue above that the uncertainty, slippery slope, and spillover
effects concerns should not be sufficient reasons to preclude a humanitarian
necessity justification in IHL, it must be acknowledged that the institutional
environment of the international sphere is different from the domestic context.
The differences between the two systems give rise to an additional set of
concerns that must be addressed-in particular, about whether the
introduction of exceptions into the international criminal system might
undermine the entire project of IHL.
As earlier noted, IHL, like much of international law, operates in an
anarchical system, which is devoid of any central legislative, mandatory
adjudication, or enforcement mechanisms. 204 This gap is particularly
significant given the core values of IHL and the tense environment in which it
operates: as a system of laws designed to minimize the amount of harm one
may inflict on one's enemies in the midst of an armed conflict, IHL is often
perceived as constraining the military effectiveness of the combating forces,
thereby creating strong short-term incentives to defect from it. Violations by
the enemy, in turn, invite reciprocal (even if illegal) violations, and a cycle
forms.
Avoiding a cycle of violations and the gradual erosion of all of IHL
requires an agreement or authoritative determination of what the law actually
prescribes, what qualifications are allowed, and what retaliation, if at all, is
permissible. It also demands an institutional framework that would make these
determinations binding and effective. But IHL still relies predominantly on
domestic courts adjudicating war crimes committed by their own agents. Self-
regulation through adjudication is presumably less trustworthy than external
judgment by an independent international body. Domestic enforcement, for
the most part, takes place only where the state has an interest in the
prosecution, that is, where the state distances itself from the act of the agent.
But most violations of the laws of war are committed under the instruction of
the state, or with its approval after the fact; rarely are war crimes
acknowledged by the state, let alone prosecuted by it.
The inherent institutional weakness of the international system makes
the dangers of recognizing any exception to the laws of war more substantial
than in its corresponding domestic system. Law that cannot rely on effective
institutions to uphold it, and for which reason would hardly qualify as "law"
205in any Austinian sense, must instead fall back predominantly on its
expressive force or normative pull. The instructive force of IHL norms rests
on their moral authority rather than on any concrete sanction. By according
preference to strict rules and eliminating exceptions, the normative message is
203. Institutional features are often considered second-order principles. I address them here as a
separate subset of rule-consequentialism analysis.
204. On the challenges of dispute settlement mechanisms in an anarchical society, see generally
Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of
International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1229 (2004).
205. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE
STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 35 (Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire & Richard Wollheim eds., Humanities
Press 1965) (1832).
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kept clear and unqualified: "Do not ever kill civilians" is a plainer prescription
than "Do not kill civilians unless it is to save the lives of more civilians."
Absolutism makes it idiomatic that killing civilians is evil, rather than a
conditional evil, dependent on the circumstances of the killing. When the
message is blurred, "just" and "unjust" conduct is harder to evaluate. This all
means that adding exclusions, however justifiable, to IHL runs the risk of
weakening the law's single source of strength-its expressive force.
20 6
If so, the integration of anything like a humanitarian necessity
justification into IHL may require a prior material change in the institutional
environment of the laws of war. Such change may have to incorporate an
independent, credible, and professional judicial institution, capable of putting
the claim under close scrutiny.
Nonetheless, concerns regarding the recognition of a humanitarian
necessity paradigm in the absence of such institutional reform may not be as
significant as they appear at first glance. First, it is unclear that recognizing
the justification would necessarily lead to more ambiguity with regard to what
constitutes compliant or noncompliant behavior. Most ambiguities rest on how
to interpret existing exceptions or tradeoffs that are designed to protect
military interests. For instance, when civilians die in attacks, debates arise as
to whether their death was proportionate collateral damage or excessive and
unjustified. Similarly, when certain types of weapons are employed on the
battlefield, disputes arise as to whether these weapons cause "superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering." 20 7 "Superfluous" and "unnecessary" are
terms weighed in the balance against the military need for using that particular
type of weapon at a given moment. A humanitarian justification, in contrast,
would center only on humanitarian needs, ignoring any consideration of
military necessity. There is no reason to expect that the weighing of
humanitarian considerations alone would be likely to cause any greater
ambiguity for the decisionmakers on the battlefield.
Second, concerning the expressive force of the law, the effects of formal
exceptions on the symbolic power of prohibitions have been debated in the
literature on torture. 20 8 Different positions on whether, when, and how torture
should be allowed rest, in part, on different predictions about the impact of
any exception-formal or informal-on the strength of the message that
torture is taboo. Without repeating these debates, and while acknowledging
that this point is a matter of concern, conditioning the successful invocation of
the humanitarian necessity justification on an actual showing of lesser
humanitarian harm is likely to amplify the humanitarian message, not silence
it.2
°9 "Do not kill civilians unless it is to save the lives of more civilians" is a
less clear message than "Do not ever kill civilians," but it can, at the same
time, reinforce and magnify the value of civilian lives.
206. On the symbolic force of the absolute ban on torture, for instance, see Gross, supra note
15, at 1504; and Waldron, supra note 97, at 1723-26.
207. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 35.
208. See Gross, supra note 15, at 1487, 1501-03.
209. See also FRANCK, supra note 8, at 190 ("Indeed, a law with an eye to mitigating
circumstances is likely to be seen as more legitimate than one that brooks no exceptions.").
2010]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Moreover, it is not inconceivable to imagine that the message of the
absolute nature of current IHL prescriptions has been indoctrinated so well
among the fighting forces and policymakers of some countries that it has
prohibited them from considering courses of action that might have spared
suffering and damage among the populations at war. If this is so, the
expressive power of the law has potentially turned extreme. For example, if
the possibility of assassinating rogue leaders is not discussed among some
circles due to the concern that it might be in violation of international law, the
ramifications of this avoidance must also be considered by those who care
about international law.
Third, a closer look at the enforcement of IHL reveals a more optimistic
prospect for allowing a humanitarian justification paradigm. On a very basic
level, reciprocity undoubtedly offers a strong political and practical
motivation for compliance, even if it is no longer a legal condition. The laws
of war were originally developed not out of any humanitarian concern for "the
other," but out of a self-interested concern for one's own soldiers and
nationals. The concern for others was merely the reciprocal price to pay. To
the extent states today have an interest in preserving the laws of war, the self-
regulation system should operate no differently in the context of a
humanitarian necessity than it does with regard to any IHL rule.
In terms of adjudication, some domestic courts enjoy a high reputation
as credible, legitimate, and professional institutions. They have shown
themselves able to rule against domestic stakeholders or even their own
government, upholding the rule of international law. The Israeli HCJ ruling
against the use of the Early Warning Procedure is a case in point. Although
still far from perfectly credible, it is not immediately clear why such courts
should not ever be trusted to apply the humanitarian necessity justification.
For less trustworthy systems, the implications of recognizing a
humanitarian necessity justification would seem to be of little importance. The
chances that anyone could successfully challenge a government's actions or
policies as contrary to IHL are slim to begin with, and whether the
government wins on the basis of the justification or because the action is
approved on different grounds makes no real difference.21°
On the international level, the justification makes a greater difference,
especially when the operation of the ICC is concerned. Although young, the
ICC set out, at least in aspiration, to serve as exactly the kind of judicial
institution that is legitimate, objective, professional, and independent of the
interests of any particular state. If we support this effort by the ICC, there is
less reason for not trusting it with a lesser-evil justification. To recall, the
Rome Statute already incorporates some justifications for war crimes (such as
self-defense or the combined necessity/duress claim) and if its claim to
professionalism and objectivity is to be taken seriously, it is unclear why it
210. Where an individual soldier wishes to invoke the justification against his or her
government's position, for instance, in domestic criminal proceedings, the implications of recognizing
such a justification would again depend on the credibility of the domestic judicial system. In countries
with a strong domestic judicial system, the soldier may or may not be successful in relying on the
justification. In those without a credible judicial system, it would make no difference, as the court is
unlikely to rule against the government.
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would be inappropriate, on institutional grounds, to recognize a humanitarian
justification as well.
More importantly, as I have earlier noted, the ICC may be viewed as an
effective judge not only of individuals' actions, but also of states' actions. By
operating under the rule of complementarity and trying individuals only where
their own domestic courts have been unable or unwilling to prosecute them,
the ICC, in effect, tries the state's actions through the prism of the individual's
actions. The "state" is even more likely to stand trial given the specific
provisions of the ICC that eliminate any immunity for heads of state and other
officials and impose criminal liability on commanders and other superiors
for actions committed by their subordinates. 21 2 Deterring state officials may
prove an effective check against "state violations" of IHL.
It is a lamentable feature of IHL that most of its violations go
unpunished. It is not clear, however, that recognizing a humanitarian necessity
justification as an exception to IH-L would increase the incidence of
unjustifiable violations. The rhetoric of accounting for unjustified violations
may change (from "we committed no breach of the law" to "we breached the
law in reliance on a humanitarian necessity justification"), but there is no
proof that allowing justifications on humanitarian necessity grounds would
also motivate more unjustified violations. And to the extent any exclusion or
qualification obscures the normative message of particular rules, such a
danger should be countered by upholding the justification only when a
violation is found to further IHL's overall goal of humanitarian welfare,
thereby working to reinforce the humanitarian message, not weaken it.
As the ICC gains experience and credibility, and as the incidence of
domestic judicial review of war-related activity increases, resistance to the
recognition of the humanitarian necessity justification on institutional grounds
should subside.
VI. DESIGNING A HUMANITARIAN NECESSITY JUSTIFICATION
An examination of the case studies and the analysis of the conventional
explanations for rejecting a lesser-evil paradigm while allowing it in the
domestic law sphere suggests, to my mind, that despite IHL's absolutist
stance, a humanitarian necessity justification is warranted.
Designing a workable definition of the justification that would take
stock of the real dangers that such a paradigm may harbor is a complicated
task. The actual incidence of justified violations is undoubtedly small. For the
most part, parties violate the laws of war because they have a military interest
in doing so or because they are indifferent or just plain cruel toward the
enemy.
It is nonetheless possible that the rarity of humanitarian-driven
violations is partly a derivative of the absolutist stance of international law: if
one must assume the risk of being labeled a "war criminal," the incentives for
211. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 27.
212. Id. art. 28.
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caring for the enemy are substantially reduced. This is one reason to allow for
a justification.
If this assumption is correct, when we come to design a humanitarian
necessity justification we must balance the aspiration to encourage states to
promote humanitarian welfare and the risks of unjustified exploitations of any
exemption from liability.
In so doing, we must keep in mind that IHL, like most legal systems, is
neither purely deontological nor purely consequentialist in nature. Violations
that are intended to promote a speedy victory are prohibited, even if the end of
the war would also bring an end to suffering; in the words of Michael Walzer,
"there is no right to commit crimes in order to shorten a war.'213 If there are
reasons to question the entire underlying rationale of the IHL project, and
strive instead toward a pure utilitarian framework which seeks to maximize
global welfare, these reasons invite the rewriting of IHL in its entirety-an
effort which is external to my project. As I seek to locate the paradigm of the
humanitarian necessity justification within IHL, not outside it, the justification
must be designed in a way that would justify some violations that cause less
humanitarian harm, while not opening the floodgates to all transgressions. In
other words, it must be designed in such a way that would enable us to
distinguish the right cases from the wrong ones, even bearing in mind that all
rules are ultimately bound to be over and underinclusive. 2 4
Even accepting my arguments against the absolutist stance of IHL, one
may well conceive of a variety of other mechanisms applicable to unlawful-
but-justified violations both in domestic law and IHL. One such mechanism is
a civil disobedience model where the actors violate the law in the name of a
greater good but also willingly assume the punishment for their acts. Actors
could also rely on a system of prosecutorial discretion and/or pardons that
would immunize violators from punishment after the fact. Alternatively, a
system could utilize prior judicial warrants to authorize the violation ex ante.
Without engaging in a full discussion of the merits and drawbacks of each of
these possible mechanisms, which have already been advanced in relevant
scholarship, 21 5 I choose here a paradigm of a post facto necessity justification,
by way of analogy (however incomplete) to domestic criminal law. Such a
system offers the best balance of incentives, preservation of the IHL system
and its normative force, and practical considerations.
In what follows, I sketch out some of the elements which I believe
should inform the design of a workable definition of the justification,
including: (1) measuring "lesser evil"; (2) timing of the assessment; (3)
motivations; (4) imminence and fault; (5) legislative intent; (6) causal
connection; (7) less harmful alternatives; and (8) burden and standard of
213. WALZER, supra note 12, at 210.
214. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685, 1689-90 (1976); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 1022
(1995) (commenting that by their ex ante nature rules will be both over and underinclusive).
215. See, e.g., Dershowitz, Is It Necessary, supra note 100, at 197-98 (arguing against a
necessity defense); Gross, supra note 15, at 1486-87 (supporting a categorical ban on torture with an
understanding that circumstances may call for officials to disregard the ban); Posner & Vermeule. supra
note 103, at 674 (arguing for ex ante provisions justifying coercive interrogation under limited
circumstances).
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proof. Some of the elements are expounded in greater detail, while others I
leave as questions that need to be further thought through and weighed under
various options. The elements I suggest reflect what I find to be the best
incorporation of normative, consequentialist, and institutional considerations,
but undoubtedly, there may be legitimate debates over each one of the balance
points I select. Where relevant, I return to the necessity defense in domestic
criminal law as a touchstone for the model I propose here.
A. A Lesser Evil
The cost-benefit calculation that is the essence of the justification
depends on two cumulative elements: 1) who or what should be taken into
account in making the calculation; 2) how much less is "lesser." I address
these questions separately.
1. Who Counts?
The analysis of "who should count" and "how many should count" in
the determination of what constitutes a lesser evil requires a more typological
analysis of lesser evil than under the necessity defense in criminal law. The
latter makes no explicit distinction between acts designed to protect the
interests of the actor and acts designed to protect the interests of others.
216
This is because in the domestic sphere, individuals are presumed to be
similarly situated vis-d-vis each other and vis-A-vis the state.
Operating in the theater of war, IHL, in contrast, assumes no such
equilibrium; it must assign different rights and protections to different
categories of individuals, in part to correct the biases that fighting states have
toward each other's nationals. The legal rules are designed to create incentives
for certain behavior where none would otherwise exist. Consequently, special
protection is accorded to those people and objects that fighting states have no
preexisting interest in protecting.
To fit within the IHL framework, a pure lesser-evil justification would
operate when a party commits a violation of the laws of war in furtherance of
the welfare of IHL's most protected categories alone, without any additional
benefit for the acting party itself. Much more commonly, however, parties will
operate out of a mixed concern for both protected and unprotected or less
protected interests. 217 Still, to be upheld as justified, the illegal behavior would
have to be compatible with the rationale of allocating different rights and
obligations to different categories of persons. I discuss these various
categories in what follows.
In order not to complicate things further, I limit the analysis to human
lives and well-being, and leave aside categories of protected objects, such as
civilian property, places of worship, cultural objects, and the environment. For
216. See Martin, supra note 155, at 1530, who argues that the real distinction in obtaining
successful versus unsuccessful pleas of necessity is the one between actions that uphold the existing
social order and actions that challenge it.
217. See FRANCK, supra note 8, at 189 (describing the view that humanitarian intervention
missions are always motivated by the self-interest of the intervener as well as by altruism, and that this
mixed motivation should not matter in judging the intervener's actions).
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similar reasons, I largely leave aside certain types of the less readily
quantifiable effects of war discussed earlier in the context of spillover effects.
1. Enemy Civilians
The protection of enemy civilians is first among the priorities of IHL as
evident in the numerous provisions designed to protect this category of
people. The rationale of these protections is straightforward: state A has a
natural interest to protect its own people; it has no such interest with regard to
the civilians of state B. State A might wish to harm state B's civilians or
simply be indifferent to their welfare and, in any case, even in the most
benevolent cases of humanitarian intervention, would prefer the interests of its
own civilians over the interests of state B's civilians. It then follows that the
law must create incentives for states to protect their enemy's civilians.
Notwithstanding the clear prohibitions on attacking or harming civilians
intentionally, or the general duties to take precautions to minimize harm to
civilians or minimize the dangers to civilians from hostilities, the exact scope
of the protection accorded to civilians under IHL is unclear. In particular, the
degree to which state A must sacrifice some of its soldiers in order to
minimize harm to state B's civilians is debatable. 218 The tradeoff between the
government's duty of care for its own civilians in comparison to its care for
enemy civilians is similarly unclear. Nonetheless, the protection of enemy
civilians is uncontested as a value which IHL is designed to promote.
It follows, then, that we can weigh the consequences of two actions on
the basis of how many enemy civilians would be harmed. Returning to the
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as compared to Operation Downfall, if
the latter would have resulted in more Japanese civilian casualties (again,
assuming that the laws of war were observed and that the casualties would
have been inflicted in the course of legitimate warfare), then on these grounds
and absent additional conditions, the atomic attacks could have been justified
under a humanitarian necessity justification.
A similar evaluation applies to the Early Warning Procedure. If
following the procedure resulted in fewer Palestinian casualties than would
have been expected had arrests been conducted without the Procedure, then
the interest in minimizing harm to these civilians should have warranted the
upholding of the justification.
218. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY): FINAL
REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED To REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (2000), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1257, 1273
(2000) (stating that this question was unresolved); cf DEP'T OF THE ARMY & DEP'T OF THE NAVY,
COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL (2006) (implying that such a sacrifice is strategically wise, even if not
required by law). The Additional Protocol provides that "when a choice is possible between several
military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that
the attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects."
Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 57(3). The interpretive debate relies on the term "similar
military advantage" and the question whether an operation which results in more casualties among one's
own forces should still count as "similar military advantage." See also Eyal Benvenisti, Human Dignity
in Combat: The Duty To Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV. 81, 89-90 (2006) (arguing that there is
no such duty).
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2. Enemy Soldiers
Enemy soldiers are legitimate targets in war. They are protected only
when they no longer pose a threat because they have become hors de combat
(by surrender, capture, or injury).219 A natural interest of any state is to
incapacitate the greatest number of enemy soldiers possible.
IHL affords few specific protections to enemy combatants on the field,
which include some limitations on types of weapons or the prohibition on
certain ruses of war. Still, the general principles of military necessity and
humanity suggest that some respect for the well-being of combatants, even
when they are actively engaged in the war effort, is warranted. The famous
Martens Clause, which opens the 1899 Hague Convention on the Laws and
Customs of War on Land states:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations,
from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience .... 220
The exact interpretation of this clause is under much debate, but some
writers suggest that it implies that not everything prohibited under the laws of
war is ipso facto prohibited, and that general principles of humanity must
221instruct each action. Specific provisions of IHL may also seem to suggest
that the interest in harming enemy soldiers is not without limits: the Protocol
provides that "[i]t is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors, to
threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this basis." 222 This
provision could be read as mere reinforcement of the protection for hors de
combat, but may also be read as a positive instruction to use only such force
as is actually necessary to achieve a particular military advantage.
If we read IHL as a lesser-evil bargain, one that accepts the killing of
enemy soldiers as inevitable, but not as a goal to be promoted, then we should
give credence to human life in general and include the lives of enemy soldiers
in the harms-benefits calculation. This inclusion seems particularly apt given
that it operates against a state's own self interest in the strongest possible way.
If so, the use of a prohibited weapon-for instance, poisonous gas that would
put combatants to sleep, rather than kill them-might benefit from the
humanitarian necessity justification.
Some situations would require a life-life tradeoff between enemy
civilians and enemy combatants. To be true to the goals of IHL, the lives of
enemy civilians must be held more sacred, despite the state having a weaker
interest in harming them than their compatriot combatants. Under this
analysis, if the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki left more civilians dead but
219. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 41.
220. Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land pmbl., July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 187 Consol. T.S. 429.
221. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 250
(2000).
222. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 40.
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fewer Japanese soldiers dead than Operation Downfall would have, the
bombings could not be justified under a humanitarian necessity paradigm.
3. One's Own Civilians
IHL does not make an explicit distinction between one's own civilians
and enemy civilians, and instead uses the generic term "civilian" throughout.
There are a few specific provisions that instruct a warring state to ensure
protection for its own civilians, such as by refraining from locating military
223targets within densely populated areas, on the assumption that a state has a
natural interest in protecting its own civilians and does not require additional
incentives through the prescriptions of the laws of war to do so.224 Most of the
law's provisions are therefore more relevant to the relationship between the
attacking state and the enemy's civilians. Absent the laws of war, any state
would be quick to sacrifice the interest of the enemy's nationals, civilians and
combatants, for the presumed sake of its own. The provisions dealing with
civilians were thus intended to induce states to take into account the welfare
of enemy civilians.
If we believe the state is already going to take action to protect its own
civilians, it then becomes doubtful whether those civilians should benefit
further from a humanitarian necessity justification. In other words, the
question is whether a state should be allowed to breach an IHL norm,
originally designed to protect enemy civilians or enemy combatants, for the
better protection of its own civilians.
A pertinent instance is the paradigmatic case of interrogational torture.
To avoid the problem of comparing between different values, let us assume
for the present discussion that torture is as harmful as killing. 5 We can then
frame the question as whether we should be allowed to deliberately kill an
enemy combatant who is in our hands or an enemy civilian in order to save
our own civilians. Given the incentives system of IHL, I believe the answer
must be an unequivocal "no." Unless it could be shown that a breach of an
IHL rule resulted in greater net benefit for the enemy, a greater benefit for a
state's own nationals at the expense of the enemy should not be allowed.
This conclusion is not without difficulty. As it shifts the common
justifications for torture from reliance on the interrogational purpose and the
culpability of the victim to reliance on the identity of those we wish to protect
by engaging in torture, it closes the door to the most common instances of
torture but opens up the theoretical possibility of justifying other instances,
including torture for noninterrogational purposes. Consider the earlier
mentioned hypothetical of torturing Saddam Hussein's two sons as a means of
inducing Hussein to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait in the fall of 1990.
223. Id. art. 58(b).
224. The field of human rights law, which has developed since the second half of the twentieth
century, governs the relationship between a government and its own citizens.
225. Note that for Henry Shue, for instance, torture is worse than killing, because torture
"fail[s] to satisfy even [the] weak constraint of being a 'fair fight."' Shue, supra note 101, at 130. For
Posner and Vermeule, it's less harmful, because "killing, unlike torture, utterly extinguishes the victim
and forever denies him any future possibility of exercising autonomy or enjoying human dignity."
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 103, at 678.
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Under the humanitarian necessity paradigm, and assuming the U.S.
government has no special interest (at least, nothing resembling its care for
American citizens) in the well-being of Iraqi or Kuwaiti civilians, such torture
would not necessarily be excluded from the parameters of the humanitarian
justification. This is in opposition, for instance, to the torturing of suspected
terrorists even in a "ticking-bomb" scenario, if the immediate beneficiaries
from this torture are American nationals.
It is possible that actions taken to protect one's own civilians--or
soldiers-might enjoy the justification of self-defense under Article 31 (1)(c)
or the joint necessity-duress defense under Article 31(l)(d) of the Rome
226Statute. Since there is no case law on either of these articles and the
227
commentaries on their desired interpretation are divergent, we cannot
determine at this time whether or not such pleas will be successful. In any
case, these pleas would not be part of the humanitarian necessity claim I
suggest here.
4. One's Own Soldiers
For any country at war, protecting soldiers228 is as strong-sometimes
even immediately stronger-an interest as protecting its civilians. Soldiers are
the war machines of the government. Their success in their mission would
determine the fate of the government and country.
The minimization of harm to one's own soldiers should thus not form
the basis for any calculus under the humanitarian necessity justification. This
does not mean that in any case in which the interest of a state in the well-being
of its own soldiers came into consideration it would foil the humanitarian
necessity justification. I am willing to expand the humanitarian motivation to
a mixed concern for the enemy as well as one's own nationals but exclude a
229
sole or overriding concern for one's own combatants or civilians.
Accordingly, if the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki spared the lives
of American soldiers that would have otherwise been killed in further combat,
but increased the number of Japanese civilian casualties, they could not be
covered by the humanitarian justification. And, in a different context, if it
were proven that the Early Warning Procedure endangered Palestinian
civilians to a greater degree than traditional arrests, it should have been struck
down on similar grounds even if it were shown that soldiers were better
protected by it.
To sum up, since states already have an inherent interest in protecting
their own nationals, both civilian and military, and since this interest is
already incorporated into the laws of war through the military necessity part of
the bargain, the humanitarian necessity justification should not be allowed to
226. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. (31)(1)(c)-(d); supra Section II.B.
227. Specifically on self-defense under Article 31(l)(c), see Hannah Tonkin, Defensive Force
Under the Rome Statute, 6 MELB. J. INT'L L. 86 (2005).
228. I ignore, for present purposes, the difference between conscripted soldiers and volunteers,
a difference that features in some philosophical debates around Just War or the principle of distinction in
the laws of war, but nowhere in the laws of war themselves.
229. In fact, when actions benefit both the enemy and the state's own nationals, the state would
have a greater incentive in carrying them out.
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operate in furtherance of these interests alone. Instead, the justification should
operate only where, following the laws of war, the action resulted in greater
welfare for the enemy. Any additional net benefit for the state's own soldiers
and civilians is an advantage, but is neither necessary nor sufficient for a valid
claim.
A final word on the potential for spillover: some acts constitute more
than one violation. Killing a civilian intentionally is simultaneously a
violation of the absolute ban on killing civilians and of the derivative duty to
take precautions in order to minimize harm to civilians. Even more so, the use
of any prohibited weapon implies the development, production, and
stockpiling of the weapon-all violations of arms control agreements. In fact,
it is difficult to conceive of a scenario in which employing a prohibited
weapon--one that is also prohibited domestically (unlike tear gas, for
instance)-would ever meet the conditions set forth for a necessary
humanitarian act.
5. Others
The typology of "one's own civilians and combatants" and "the enemy's
civilians and combatants" fits the traditional war model, but might not apply
perfectly to all theaters of modem war. In humanitarian interventions, peace
enforcement missions, counterinsurgency operations, or the war on terror, the
classification of "enemy combatants" is easier to contemplate than the
designation of civilians as "enemy civilians."
Nonetheless, the rationale that restricts humanitarian necessity
calculations to include only those who the acting government has no
immediate and direct incentives to protect-namely, its own civilians or
combatants--endures in these more complex environments as well. If so, the
calculation should include civilians and combatants who do not belong to the
acting power or its allies or coalition partners, and should prefer the welfare of
civilians to that of combatants in accordance with the spirit of the laws of war.
2. How Many Count?
A related but separate question is not only who should count but also
how many should count in justifying a violation of the laws of war, or, in
other words, how much "lesser" should the lesser evil be in order to justify
humanitarian necessity.
The standard account of the domestic necessity defense is that the
defendant has acted to prevent a significant evil and that the remedy she chose
was not disproportionate to the harm averted. 23 Proportionality is nowhere
defined. The commentary to the Model Penal Code suggests that necessity is
applicable even where the defendant killed one person in order to save the
230. See Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law:
The Right To Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 294 (1974); Laura J.
Schulkind, Note, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 79, 82
(1989).
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lives of two or more. 231 This test would seem to suggest a strict utilitarian
calculus, by which any increase in the net benefit to society would meet the
proportionality test.
A strict utilitarian approach is compatible with an act-utilitarian
framework that seeks to increase the net benefit of society. A utilitarian
standard that would require a "significant" benefit would in contrast be more
appropriate if we were inherently suspicious of the decisionmaker's ability to
make lesser-harm determinations and prefer to avoid borderline cases.
Because, under the argument I present here, the lesser evil is already
conditioned on a net benefit for the enemy, rather than on a state's own
benefit alone, the lesser-harm formula might seem to be justifiable under a
strict utilitarian calculus. It may be that, as a practical matter, it would be
easier to demonstrate the justifiability of the violation where the net benefit is
substantial, especially where there is net benefit for a state's own nationals as
well or where the transgression is especially egregious. But this is a practical
and evidentiary consideration, not a conceptual one.
Under this analysis, accepting the IDF's argument that out of hundreds
of cases in which the Early Warning Procedure was employed only one
Palestinian civilian has been killed, a strict utilitarian analysis would uphold a
lesser-evil calculus if it could be shown that as a result of the procedure, at
least two Palestinian civilians were spared. Nonetheless, indirect costs of
harming hundreds of individuals' dignity in coercing them to cooperate with
the occupying forces would have to be incorporated into the calculus as well.
Despite the fact that a strict utilitarian analysis is theoretically acceptable
on some levels, there may be important reasons to demand a higher standard. I
would contend that the "significant" requirement better protects the
humanitarian message of IHL and signals that violations are justified only in
the extreme case; this is one compelling reason to adopt the more restrictive
test. In addition, the "significant" test is more appropriate if one believes, as I
do, that the dangers of uncertainty and slippery slope exploitations as well as
the spillover costs are substantially greater in the context of war than in
domestic interactions. It also stands to reason that a "significant benefit" test
would protect against moral hazard, by which actors might engage in harmful
and unjustified violations of IHL believing they would be protected under the
humanitarian necessity defense. Raising the benefit-calculation bar would also
diminish the similar moral hazard concern that states, counting on the
humanitarian necessity argument, might have greater propensity to engage in
wars in the first place. Of course, the interest in reinforcing the humanitarian
message or countering the risks of misapplication would have to be weighed
against the interest in exercising the humanitarian justification in cases where
the net benefit is positive, even if not significant. Nevertheless, for the reasons
stated here, the strict utilitarian framework ultimately seems too risky.
If, despite the foregoing analysis, we were to accept that the saving of a
state's own civilians justifies a humanitarian necessity exemption even where
the net benefit to the enemy was negative, the strict utilitarian calculus would
be even less appropriate. Rather, it would have to shift significantly to correct
231. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 1 (1985).
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against the inherent bias of governments in favor of their own nationals. In
such cases, therefore, we should certainly demand a substantial benefit for the
national civilians in comparison with the harm caused. This corresponds to
scholars' intuitions about justifying (or excusing) torture in catastrophic
232scenarios, but not otherwise.
B. Timing ofAssessment
Any choice with regard to the timing of the assessment of the
humanitarian impact of the transgression has to balance the fears of
underdeterring "bad" violations against the risks of overdeterring justified
ones.
The domestic criminal law does not require a post hoc factual showing
that the defendant had in fact chosen the lesser harm; all it requires is that the
defendant reasonably believed she was choosing the lesser-evil path when she
made her choice.233 Thus, it is possible for an actor to enjoy the protection of
the necessity defense even if her acts ultimately resulted in greater harm.
There are good reasons not to follow the same test in the IHL context.
As noted in the preceding discussion of the consequentialist accounts, a post
hoc determination which would demand an actual showing of a lesser harm
could offer important safeguards against the risks related to uncertainty,
slippery slopes and spillover costs-risks which may be even higher in the
war context than in the domestic context. Having to bear the onus of proving a
lesser-evil outcome, international actors would be more hesitant to engage in
dangerous experiments in war crimes and instead follow only those cases in
which the net benefit to the enemy could be well ascertained in advance.
But there are also good reasons to depart from the post hoc test, and
follow, instead, the domestic law test. One is that making the determination
dependent on the ability to prove "success" might drive actors to intensify
their transgressions if milder ones did not in fact produce lesser harm.
Another concern is that the ex post determination runs the risk of
overdeterring justified violations. By already requiring that the justification
operate only where there is a net benefit to the enemy, and especially if we
were to adopt a "significant" lesser-harm formula, the risks of underdeterring
malevolent exploitations are diminished.
The choice between these two options-between the risk of
underdeterrence and of overdeterrence--depends on some prior judgment
about decisionmaking in wartime. In particular, the question is whether we
believe that individuals facing lesser-evil choices are better or worse than
professional decisionmakers (commanders or politicians) in evaluating risks
and probabilities in the face of emergencies.
232. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Torture, the State and the Individual, 23 ISR. L. REv. 345,
346 (1989) (stating that torture is such a significant human rights violation that only the saving of a large
number of innocents can justify it).
233. See CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 785 (2005).
Note, however, that Robinson seems to prefer an actual post factum showing of a lesser harm.
ROBINSON, supra note 147, at 46, 60.
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C. Intentions
While requiring a post hoc showing of success, the domestic necessity
defense requires that ex ante, the defendant reasonably anticipated a causal
connection between his actions and prevention of the harm.
One can imagine certain actions that would result in a net benefit for the
enemy but that were carried out without the intention of producing such a
benefit. To protect IHL from unjustified transgressions and to genuinely
realize its goals, as well as emphasize its humanitarian message, we must
require those who wish to violate its provisions to demonstrate that a genuine
humanitarian intention had driven their actions. Ensuring the element of good
intentions alongside the estimate of good outcomes is intended to guarantee
that the humanitarian necessity justification would always be understood as an
exception to the rule that could be justified only as means of furthering
humanitarian goals.
It then follows that if Samuel Walker is correct and the humanitarian
motivations behind the atomic bombings of Japan were contrived in
retrospect, meaning American decisionmakers had little regard for Japanese
lives when the decision to use the bomb was made, then those decisionmakers
should not have been able to benefit from a humanitarian justification.234
The evidentiary question of how to assess the real motivations behind an
individual's choice of action is no different in this context than in any other
case that requires proof of mens rea to find a defendant guilty or innocent. As
in such other cases, one can imagine a post hoc judgment relying on
confidential communications within the government or operational briefings
to the forces on the ground as a way of ascertaining motivations, at least to
some degree.
D. Imminence and Fault
235
Despite much criticism, the imminence of harm is a requirement of
the domestic necessity defense. The requirement of imminence stands for an
urgent need to break the law rather than leisurely pursuing alternative lawful
means to avert the harm. Imminence also implies that the individual's decision
had to be made quickly, under a sense of looming threat, not necessarily in
consideration of all possible alternatives for action. This last narrowing
requirement is intended to encourage people to pursue lawful means when
they seek to prevent harm and allow them to break the law only when
absolutely necessary.
But in war, all action has a sense of imminence and urgency to it.
Emergency is not a rarity, but a common occurrence. It then makes little sense
to add the domestic requirement of imminence.
Furthermore, when the government does make a decision to break the
law in war, it is not usually a hasty decision in reaction to an emergency, but a
thoroughly deliberated one. Cases of the type presented by the Early Warning
Procedure or the attacks on Japan are not the result of decisions made on the
234. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
235. See Martin, supra note 155, at 1567-79; ROBINSON, supra note 147, at 56-58.
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spur of the moment. At least as a conceptual matter, they involve a careful
assessment and the weighing of possible courses of action by experts. This is
especially the case where a policy of breaking the law (as in the Early
Warning Procedure case), rather than a single violation at a particular
moment, is concerned.
The requirement that the defendant did not contribute to the choice-of-
evils situation-a requirement which is absent from many iterations of the
necessity defense but appears in the Model Penal Code 236 -is similarly
irrelevant to a state at war. 237 Any battlefield situation is the result of the
strategic interaction between the parties to the conflict, making every action
the result of the parties' "contributory fault." The concept of contributory fault
makes sense only where we fear emergencies would be contrived to exploit
the defense. In war, emergencies are not normally contrived; they are simply
part of war.
Moreover, as a matter of law, IHL binds all parties to the conflict
regardless of the jus ad bellum aspects of the conflict; in other words, the laws
of war apply to conduct independently of the question of who is to blame for
the war in the first place. In this sense, IHL rejects the concept of "fault" as
affecting the application of its provisions in much the same way that it rejects
reciprocity as a condition for compliance. It would then seem incongruent to
make contributory fault a reason not to allow a party to engage in
humanitarian-driven actions.
For all these reasons, to the extent domestic criminal law actually
demands the showing of imminence and the lack of contributory fault, these
requirements are overly restrictive when applied to the humanitarian necessity
justification.
E. Causal Connection
In the domestic law context, the element of causality is often defined as
demanding that "the defendant can reasonably expect that his action will be
effective as the direct cause of abating the danger.' 238 This test is understood
as adding an objective element to the subjective good-intentions requirement.
Shaun Martin has argued that even though the causation requirement is
consistent with the structure and object of the necessity defense, as well as
compatible with its utilitarian function, it has been unduly restricting as
applied by courts. 239 Martin claims that "the social preference for at least
some types of illegal conduct (for example, a trespass to save a drowning
child) even when almost assuredly futile also casts doubt on the legitimacy of
236. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2) (1985).
237. But see Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 3 l(l)(d), requiring that the threat either emanated
from someone other than the defendant or else was "constituted by other circumstances beyond that
person's control."
238. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCambridge, 690 N.E.2d 470, 474 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998);
State v. Hage, No. C2-99-1051, 1999 WL 1256357, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1999) (necessity
defense available only when "there was a direct causal connection between breaking the law and
preventing the harm").
239. Martin, supra note 155, at 1579-84.
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the causation requirement as a categorical prerequisite.,, 240 Instead, Martin
argues, causation-like imminence-should be made a consideration in the
weighing of necessity, not a condition.
In the context of a humanitarian necessity justification, requiring a
"direct" causal connection between the violation and the harm abated would
seem right as a way of distinguishing between true necessity cases and other
violations of IHL, especially those intended to gain victory (with or without
the justification that with an end to war, suffering too is abated).
Accordingly, torturing an enemy POW to gain military information that
would assist the fighting forces in gaining a decisive advantage would not be
protected under the humanitarian necessity justification, even if the decisive
advantage turned into a military victory and put an end to the suffering of
enemy combatants and civilians. The "direct" beneficiaries of this information
are the torturer's own soldiers, which under my proposal would not be able to
account for a lesser-evil justification. The causal connection between the
information obtained and the lesser harm to enemy civilians and combatants is
too remote to be justified without defying any limitations on warfare.
The "direct" formula offers a far from perfect test. Consider, for
instance, a claim by the torturing party in the above hypothetical that the
information obtained from the POW was instrumental in containing the war
effort to a particular front, thereby sparing enemy combatants in all other
regions. This hypothetical would seem to meet the "direct causal connection"
test, but at the same time veer too close to the "military victory" argument.
Uncovering the true motivations behind the torture might also assist in
distinguishing among justified and unjustified transgression. Still, the causal
connection offered here would not be able to offer clear guidance in all cases
and some case-by-case judgment on the merits would be required.
In eliminating the "military victory" argument, the judgment of the
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki immediately presents itself for
reevaluation. Undoubtedly designed to achieve victory and end the war, the
attacks might nonetheless be justified if we were to determine that under the
prevailing political and military circumstances, winning the war was the only
thing left to do. Continuing well after Germany's surrender, the final active
front of a six-year-old world conflict had withstood the fire-bombings of
Tokyo and the invasion of Okinawa and the hundreds of thousands of
casualties that it had left behind. Perhaps this is the sui generis case in which a
military victory that ends the war is a warranted exception. Still, many
questions that depend on which historical account we choose to accept are left
unanswered: was the insistence on Japan's unconditional surrender, as
opposed to a conditional one, justified? Was the attack on Nagasaki, only
three days after Hiroshima, necessary to get the Emperor to surrender or was it
superfluous and wantonly excessive? And finally, were there no less harmful
means that could have yielded a similar result?
240. Id. at 1583.
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F. Less Harmful Alternatives
To be truly justified, a net utilitarian calculation is insufficient; the actor,
instead, must be able to show that she had chosen the least possible harmful
means that could avert the greater evil, without jeopardizing the success of the
military mission. This further condition is intended to supplement the causal
connection between the violation and the aversion of harm and to ensure that
the lesser-evil justification is not used to mask unnecessary atrocities.
The domestic necessity defense does not require this condition; instead,
it offers only a vague proportionality test. The joint necessity-duress clause in
the ICC's Rome Statute includes a similarly broad test, namely that "the
person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat., 241 Both domestic
necessity and ICC necessity operate only when the defendant has acted
against an imminent threat. But where a government chooses in a
nonimminent, premeditated decision to break the law, it supposedly can and
should assess the full ramifications of the violation, including by considering
less harmful means, whether legal or illegal themselves.
In the Early Warning case, the High Court of Justice addressed the
possible use of loudspeakers as an alternative to reliance on civilians. The
IDF's position was that the use of loudspeakers would call attention to the
forces operating, thereby increasing the risk of all-round escalation. It is
unclear to what extent this alternative affected the final decision of the judges,
and whether the Court ultimately struck down the Procedure despite deferring
to the IDF's judgment on this particular issue.
Those who are willing to accept the use of torture commonly agree that
it must be restricted to those cases where a similar outcome could not be
achieved by any other means. Consequently, if any less harmful measure (for
instance, detention, the taking of hostages, or even the threat of using torture)
would have had a similar probability of success, torture would be
unjustifiable. The combination of the least harmful means and the motivation
of alleviating the suffering of the enemy make the justifiable use of torture-
or other wartime atrocities, such as rape-highly unlikely.
The less harmful means requirement casts the largest shadow over the
attacks on Hiroshima, and more so, on Nagasaki. Was it indeed impossible to
avert Operation Downfall by using less disastrous means? Or were scientists
who argued for inviting U.N. representatives to a live demonstration of the
explosion in the desert correct that this option had to be tried out first before
dropping the bomb on densely populated cities? Does the insistence of the
Emperor on conditional surrender even after the widespread firebombing of
Tokyo and the invasion of Okinawa prove that there were no other options?
Did the conditions set by the Emperor warrant the continuation of the war?
Could the use of nuclear weapons ever be justified under the "least harmful
requirement" condition? Hindsight may lead us to ask these questions, but it
does not, unfortunately, provide answers. And still, while it is possible to
imagine a no-real-alternative argument for the bombing of Hiroshima, the
241. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 31(1)(d).
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case for Nagasaki-bombed only three days after Hiroshima and without any
serious attempt to pursue alternative measures-seems implausible.
G. Burden of Proof
Operating as a justification, rather than a source of obligation, the
burden of proof of the various elements of the necessity justification should be
placed on the actor seeking to invoke it. 242 This allocation of responsibility
should guard not only against disingenuous claims, but would also place the
problem of uncertainty on the shoulders of the actor. In case of doubt, the rule
should be upheld against the justification.
H. Summary
A workable definition of a humanitarian necessity justification might
read as follows:
A person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's
conduct:
The conduct that is alleged to constitute a crime was designed to minimize harm
to individuals other than the defendant's compatriots, the person could reasonably expect
that his or her action would be effective as the direct cause of minimizing the harm, and
there were no less harmful alternatives under the circumstances to produce a similar
humanitarian outcome.
Among the examples offered throughout this Article, humanitarian
interventions, assassinations of rogue leaders, the Early Warning Procedure,
and, in some extreme cases, even the deliberate killing of civilians or
combatants who are hors de combat, might be justified under a humanitarian
necessity justification, provided they meet all the relevant conditions. In
contrast, interrogational torture designed to prevent attacks on our own
nationals would, under this paradigm, remain unjustifiable.
The blueprint for a humanitarian necessity justification offered here is
tentative and debatable. Weighing the pros and cons of every possible
articulation of every relevant element requires a careful balancing between
over and underdeterrence, and depends not only on sound legal judgment but
also on how one views the world of war and its effects on human judgment.
Adapting the domestic necessity defense to fit a humanitarian necessity
justification in war depends, in particular, on our relative trust in
individuals-or governments-in making lesser-evil determinations in times
of emergency.
VII. CONCLUSION
Wars do not suffer from excessive humanitarian zeal. The tragedy of one
side is the other's triumph. Often the more demonstrable a tragedy is, the
242. See also FRANCK, supra note 8, at 190 (arguing that since humanitarian interventions are a
departure from the general prohibition on the use of force, it "leaves the onus of proof squarely with
those seeking a dispensation from the general rule").
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greater the sense of triumph of the ascendant party. Such zero-sum strategic
interaction, fueled by aggression, fear, and hate, breeds what we dub both
"necessary" and "unnecessary" evils. The effort of IHL to keep these evils at
bay should be well-guarded. However, the law as its stands does not
necessarily enable us to distinguish the inevitable evil from the superfluous
one as much as we need. In fact, the system currently accustoms us so much
to notions of suffering as a "necessary" evil of war that we have been largely
benumbed to this suffering as a moral matter. Since it is legally acceptable, we
do not quarrel with its morality.
Quarreling with the morality of what is legally unacceptable is always a
delicate task. Nonetheless, I argue that the law's current absolutist stance
prevents parties in conflict from lawfully pursuing actions that might lessen
the harms of war. Specifically, I argue that it is possible to conceive of a
humanitarian necessity justification, a variation on the necessity defense in
domestic criminal law, which would exempt those who pursue such actions
from criminal liability. Such an exemption, I hope and expect, could further
the humanitarian goals of IHL without eroding its rules and status. What is
required for such an exemption to work is a willingness on our part to shift the
focus of care from the immediate, visible victims to would-be, invisible ones
who are nonetheless just as real. We must not inertly accept certain victims as
the necessary collateral damage of war, but instead make a positive and
genuine choice to protect many by harming the few.
The analysis I offer in this Article raises much broader questions than
can be answered here about the current system of IHL and its future
development. One such comprehensive question is the degree to which
utilitarianism, on the one hand, or deontology, on the other, can and should
inform the design of the laws of war. As this Article shows, the current system
of IHL is neither purely deontological-for it makes numerous concessions in
allowing wars to be fought in the first place-nor purely consequentialist-for
it prohibits certain actions even when those might produce less suffering in
totality. This Article follows the basic premises of IHL and locates the
humanitarian necessity justification within them. But if IHL is an
amalgamation of rules stemming from different moral intuitions, political
compromises, and historical contingencies, it should not be an impossible or
prohibited task to imagine amending the laws of war in a way that would
better protect humanitarian interests.
The fact that the inquiry into the moral drive of IHL and its various
provisions has heretofore largely remained within the province of
philosophical studies is particularly surprising given the ongoing deliberations
about utilitarianism versus absolutism in other fields of law.243 This question
seems especially relevant given current debates about the suitability or
unsuitability of existing rules in the context of the war on terrorism and
possible adaptations to new kinds of conflicts, actors, and technologies. Many
of these debates can be understood in terms of the tension between absolute
moral prescriptions and utilitarian design. Whatever the right balance between
243. For a thorough survey on the topic, see Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VS.
WELFARE (2002).
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these competing drives is, I suggest that the quality of practical mercy, so to
speak, and a constant remembrance of the value of individual human life
should remain our lodestar.

